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 ABSTRACT 
CONSIDERING HANS-GEORG GADAMER’S PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 
AS A REFERENT FOR STUDENT UNDERSTANDING OF 
NATURE-OF-SCIENCE CONCEPTS 
by 
Jared M. Rashford 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine philosophical hermeneutics as a referent for 
student understanding of Nature-of-Science (NOS) concepts. Rather than focus on a 
prescriptive set of canons used in addressing NOS pedagogy in K-12 schools, this study 
seeks to explicate a descriptive set of principles based on Hans Georg-Gadamer’s theory 
of interpretation that has the potential for developing dispositions necessary for 
understanding. Central among these are the concepts of fore-structure, prejudice, 
temporal distance, and history of effect, all of which constitute part of the whole of the 
hermeneutic circle as envisaged by Gadamer. As such, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is 
contrasted with Cartesian epistemology and its primacy of method, the Enlightenment’s 
prejudice against prejudice, the modernist/progressive tendency to consider all situations 
as problems to be solved by relegating all forms of knowledge to techné, and the 
subjective nature of interpretation inherent in a hermeneutics of suspicion. The 
implication of such a conceptual analysis for NOS pedagogy is that student understanding 
is considered not so much as a cognitive outcome dependent on a series of mental 
functions but rather as an ontological characteristic of Dasein (being-human) that situates 
learning in the interchange between interpreter and text.  In addition, the philosophical
 foundations implicit in addressing student understanding of NOS found in many 
curricular reform efforts and pedagogical practices in science education are questioned. 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics affords science education a viable philosophical framework 
within which to consider student understanding of the development of scientific 
knowledge and the scientific enterprise.       
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CHAPTER ONE 
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND 
NATURE-OF-SCIENCE UNDERSTANDING 
 
Introduction 
Scholarship pertaining to the teaching and learning of nature-of-science (NOS) 
concepts in K-12 schools gained momentum in the 1990s as a result of the heightened 
significance imparted on both student and teacher understandings of scientific knowledge 
and the scientific enterprise found in three seminal curriculum reform documents released 
at the turn of the century.1 Numerous scholars have sought to examine how such 
understandings relate to particular tenets posited to be representative of a consensus, 
desired view of NOS whereas others have explored their relationship to effective 
classroom practice.2 While these studies may suggest similar findings supported through 
empirical observations, they generally fail to provide a philosophical analysis of the 
concept of understanding itself and, in fact, may potentially foreclose student and teacher 
understandings of NOS. I contend here that the discipline of hermeneutics affords NOS 
                                                 
1 American Association for the Advancement of Science, Project 2061: Science for All Americans 
(Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1989); American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Benchmarks for Science Literacy: A Project 2061 Report (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993); 
and National Research Council, National Science Education Standards (Washington, DC: National 
Academic Press, 1996).  
2 The scholarship pertaining to student NOS understandings is discussed at length both later in this chapter 
as well as in Chapter Three. For an example of research pertaining to a consensus view, see Norman 
Lederman and Molly O’Malley, “Students’ Perceptions of Tentativeness in Science: Development, Use, 
and Sources of Change,” Science Education 74 (1990): 225-239. For an example of research related to 
effective classroom practice, see Nancy Brickhouse, “Teachers' Beliefs About the Nature of Science and 
Their Relationship to Classroom Practice,” Journal of Teacher Education 41, no. 3 (1990): 53-62. 
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scholars and the greater education community an opportunity to enlarge the discourse 
surrounding the concept of understanding; a form of reasoning that, at least in science 
education, seems to have almost entirely managed to escape any form of conceptual 
analysis despite its ubiquitous mention in both the literature and policy documents. 
 Shawn Gallagher, in his important work Hermeneutics and Education, initially 
addresses the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the use of the term hermeneutics in a 
variety of disciplines including theology, law, philosophy, literature, and the social 
sciences.3 What he finds in common among the multifarious definitions included is their 
respective identification of understanding or interpretation as the subject matter of 
hermeneutics.  In particular, this study emphasizes philosophical hermeneutics as 
explicated by Hans-Georg Gadamer. While he did not write extensively on the subject of 
education,4 Gadamer is credited with developing a hermeneutics not as an attempt to 
prescribe a method or set of methods for understanding “…but to discover what is 
common to all modes of understanding and to show that understanding is never a 
subjective relation to a given ‘object’ but to the history of its effect; in other words, 
understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood.”5 Gallagher interprets 
Gadamer’s philosophy as a moderate hermeneutics situated between the more 
conservative claims of Schleiermacher, Betti, and Hirsch, the more radical views of 
Nietzche, Heidegger, and Derrida, and the more critical perspectives of Habermas, Marx, 
                                                 
3 Shaun Gallagher, Hermeneutics and Education (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
3-4. This work will be cited as HE in the text for all subsequent references. Gallagher is explicit in his 
attempt to “…arrive at a working conception, although not a final or adequate definition, of hermeneutics.”  
4 See for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Education is Self-Education,” Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 35, no. 4 (2001): 529-538. 
5 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York, NY: 
Continuum Press, 2006), xxxi. This work will be cited as TM in the text for all subsequent references. 
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and Freud, each of which is addressed more thoroughly later in this introductory chapter.6  
A limited number of scholars have explored the implications of philosophical 
hermeneutics for the field of general education and science teaching and learning 
respectively. 
The goal of this study is to determine the viability of using philosophical 
hermeneutics to conceptualize student understanding of NOS. In particular, I attempt to 
expound the philosophical assumptions inherent in favoring student understanding of a 
consensus and/or desired view of NOS, as evidenced by the standards and empirical 
research. Rather than rely on the effectiveness of a  prescriptive set of canons used in 
addressing NOS pedagogy in K-12 schools, this study then seeks to explicate a 
descriptive set of principles based on Gadamer’s theory of interpretation that has the 
potential for developing dispositions for understanding NOS considerations. A 
description of such an analysis is contained in Chapter Two.  
It is important to introduce briefly at this point the distinction between a 
Gadamerian conception of understanding and one credited to Descartes7 as well as the 
Enlightenment ideal perhaps furthered by modernist progressives.8 By favoring the 
primacy of method over knowledge, education can arguably be reduced to a set of 
                                                 
6 For a brief comparison of these perspectives, see HE, 9-11. It is in particular a moderate hermeneutical 
perspective that Gallagher uses to characterize Gadamer’s thought that I will explicate in my consideration 
of NOS understandings.  
7 René Descartes, Discourse on the Method for Conducting One's Reason Well and for Seeking Truth in the 
Sciences, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998). 
8 In chapter six of HE, Gallagher uses Gadamer’s hermeneutics to present a strong argument against the 
modernist conception of education with its emphasis on techné and critical problem solving which he 
credits to the dualistic epistemology (subject/object) initiated by Descartes. Another scholar, however, uses 
the same Gadamerian notion of understanding to question the primacy Gallagher affords to his modest view 
of education over other philosophies, namely the modernist one under attack. See, Deborah Kerdeman, 
“Hermeneutics and Education: Understanding, Control and Agency,” Educational Theory 48, no. 2 (1998): 
241-266.  
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techniques which allow us to manage information which in turn can result in a direct 
transmission of the same information that amounts to a potential form of indoctrination.9 
In contrast, philosophical hermeneutics strives to retain “the term hermeneutics not in the 
sense of a methodology but as a theory of the real experience that thinking is”10 and, as 
such, favors a view of education that remains open to the possibilities of interchange and 
subsequent interpretations that are constitutive in developing understanding.11 This study 
explains the central concepts involved in Gadamer’s hermeneutics as well as integrate 
these concepts in the discourse surrounding student understanding of NOS.  
The remainder of this chapter contains an introduction to several themes that are 
further elaborated in subsequent sections, beginning with an overview of curriculum 
reform efforts and scholarly research centered on NOS instruction in K-12 schools. 
Similarly, a brief account of the development of the hermeneutic discipline is included so 
as to provide a context for comparing a variety of perspectives regarding understanding 
and interpretation as they relate to education. Lastly, the significance of the study for the 
field of science education is presented. I aim to further the work of other scholars in 
demonstrating that a hermeneutic approach to understanding not only provides a 
                                                 
9 This particular view is evidenced in the writings of Padraig Hogan and Richard Smith, “The Activity of 
Philosophy and the Practice of Education”, in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, Nigel 
Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, Paul Standish, eds., (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) as 
well as David Jardine’s, “Reflection on Education, Hermeneutics, and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics as a 
Restoring of Life to its Original Difficulty,” in William F. Pinar and William M. Reynolds, eds. 
Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text (New York, NY: Teachers 
College Press, 1992). This last reference offers a brief explanation of the relationship between 
hermeneutics and qualitative research. 
10 TM, xxxvi. 
11 While philosophical hermeneutics concerns itself more with the nature of understanding, other scholars 
have challenged Cartesian foundationalism for its epistemological merit. See for example, Giambattista 
Vico, On the Study Methods of Our Time, trans. Elio Gianturco (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1990).  
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favorable framework for NOS pedagogy but for the broader context of educational 
philosophy as well. 
NOS Considerations in the Standards and Scholarly Research 
Nearly a decade ago, DeBoer explicated the historical and contemporary 
understandings of scientific literacy.12 His thorough analysis addressed the varied 
implications inherent in the use of such an ambiguous construct for more than half of a 
century in the discipline of science education.13 From considering science education as a 
vehicle for democratic change and a legitimate intellectual pursuit to positing a strong 
relationship between scientific progress, national security, and technological and societal 
change, agencies such as National Education Agency (NEA), the National Society for the 
Study of Education (NSSE), the President’s National Research Board (PNRB), the 
National Science Teachers Association (NSTA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and the National 
Academy of Science (NAS) have attempted to define both broadly and specifically the 
concept of scientific literacy. Most recently, the latter two organizations, encouraged by 
the standards-based reform movement, developed Science for All Americans, 
Benchmarks for Science Literacy, and the National Science Education Standards, 
respectively.14  
                                                 
12 George E. Deboer, “Scientific Literacy: Another Look at its Historical and Contemporary Meanings and 
its Relationship to Science Education Reform,” Journal of Research in Science Teaching 37, no. 6 (2000): 
582-601.  
13 Rudiger Laugksch, “Scientific Literacy: A Conceptual Overview,” Science Education 84, no.1 (1999): 
71-94. In this article, the author explains how the notion of scientific literacy has come to represent a 
variety of perspectives depending on both its use and assessment by sociologists, public opinion 
researchers, and science education scholars alike.  
14 AAAS, National Research Council, op.cit. 
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While curriculum movements for the last forty years have consistently called for 
inquiry learning that attempts to create classroom experiences that mimic scientific 
research, two notable distinctions distinguish these late 20th century reform documents 
from their NSF- endorsed predecessors. While the former relied primarily on the 
direction and expertise of scientists themselves, stressing a rigorous curriculum and 
targeting future scientists, efforts of the AAAS and the NAS focused instead on minimum 
standards for all students, preparing an effective citizenry, and teaching for increased 
appreciation for science and technology.15 Secondly, the documents of the last two 
decades contain significant references to nature-of-science (NOS) considerations. 
Collectively, these have been characterized as purporting traditional images of science 
such as being open, accommodating, and antiauthoritarian. They maintain that “science 
distinguishes itself from other ways of knowing …through the use of empirical standards, 
logical arguments, and skepticism”16 thereby affording students the preeminent means of 
developing rational thinking skills. Simultaneously, researchers have noted the impact of 
the science studies community on NOS discourse as evidenced by the documents’ 
insistence on the subjective nature of scientists themselves (not scientific knowledge), the 
absence of any clearly defined scientific method, and the empirical indeterminacy of 
evidence.17   
                                                 
15 Steve Turner and Karen Sullenger, “Kuhn in the Classroom, Lakatos in the Lab: Science Educators 
Confront the Nature-of-Science Debate,” Science, Technology, and Human Values 24, no.1 (1999): 5-30.  
16 National Research Council, 201. 
17 One of the more influential philosophical/historical accounts of science in this regard is Thomas Kuhn, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). For further 
reading on Kuhn and his response to criticisms of his seminal piece, see Thomas Kuhn, The Road Since 
Structure (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2000). While many science educators delineate 
nature of science concepts in terms of their agreement with Kuhn’s characterization of normal and 
revolutionary science, claiming that his work inaugurated the postmodern era for philosophy of science, a 
few scholars question the overall impact of his text on the study of science. See, for example, D. Wade 
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The standards put forth by the AAAS in Benchmarks concerning NOS fall under 
one of three, principle categories: the scientific world view, scientific inquiry, and the 
scientific enterprise. The first of these suggests that the world is understandable and that 
scientific knowledge, while durable, is subject to change and limited. Scientific inquiry is 
explained as relying on evidence, involving both logic and imagination to explain and 
predict, and avoiding biases. Lastly, the scientific enterprise is characterized as a social 
activity organized into content disciplines, with generally accepted ethical principles, and 
consisting of individuals who participate in public affairs as specialists and as citizens. 
On the other hand, the standards published by the NAS include the construct of NOS in 
its section on Principles and Definitions:  
The relation of science to mathematics and to technology and an understanding of 
the nature of science should also be part of their [students’] education… Scientific 
literacy also includes understanding the nature of science, the scientific enterprise, 
and the role of science in society and personal life. The Standards recognize that 
many individuals have contributed to the traditions of science and that, in 
historical perspective, science has been practiced in many different cultures.18 
 
While its significance in the national education arena may have indeed only been 
realized near the turn of the century, published discourse surrounding NOS closely 
parallels that of scientific literacy in the education research community and has thus 
existed for over a century. From a contemporary perspective, however, as early as the 
1960s, scholars considered NOS understanding to be an integral component of the 
broader construct of scientific literacy,19 perhaps receiving renewed impetus from Snow’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hands, “Reconsidering the Received View of the ‘Received View:’ Kant, Kuhn and the Demise of 
Positivist Philosophy,” Social Epistemology 17, no.2 (2003): 169-173; and Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A 
Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2000).  
18 National Research Council, 220. 
19 For a general overview of research in this area, see Laugksch, “Scientific Literacy,” and Morris Shamos, 
The Myth of Scientific Literacy (Newark, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995). Shamos’ perspective 
actually represented one of the more critical arguments against the call for universal scientific literacy on 
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“two cultures” thesis positing the need to be knowledgeable in both science and the 
humanities in order to be a contributing member of a changing society.20 Still others in 
turn suggest that scientific literacy be considered as consisting of knowledge about 
science as well as knowledge in science, the first of these involving the epistemology and 
sociology of science, both of which are considered NOS perspectives.21 Additionally, 
some consider scientific literacy to lie at the intersection of NOS, scientific inquiry, and 
traditional subject matter knowledge, further indicating a considerable degree of 
consensus among scholars in the science education community regarding the role of NOS 
considerations in effective science teaching.22  
Scholarship pertaining to the teaching and learning of NOS in K-12 schools 
gained momentum in the 1990s as a result of the heightened significance imparted on 
both student and teacher understandings of scientific knowledge and the scientific 
enterprise in the aforementioned national documents. Leading researchers have explored 
and continue to explore the nature of such understandings as well as their relationship to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the grounds that there exists no conclusive evidence to suggest that the level of literacy of Americans 
presents a challenge to our ability to compete globally and make informed decisions.  One of the earlier 
recognized advocates of nature of science and the secondary curriculum was Joseph Schwab. See Joseph 
Schwab, “Inquiry, the Science Teacher, and the Educator,” The School Review 68, no.2 (1960): 176-195; 
Joseph Schwab, “What Do Scientists Do?” Behavioral Science 5 (1960): 1-27; and Joseph Schwab, 
Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978). For a 
concise review of the influence of Schwab on science education see Gary Fenstermacher, “The Nature of 
Science and Its Uses for Education: Remarks on the Philosophical Import of Schwab’s Work,” Curriculum 
Inquiry 10, no. 2 (1980): 191-197.  
20 Charles P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Blackwell Synergy Press, 
1959).   
21 Jim Ryder, “Identifying Science Understanding for Functional Scientific Literacy,” Studies in Science 
Education 36, no.1 (2001): 1-44.   
22 Renee Schwartz, Norman Lederman, and Barbara Crawford, “Developing Views of Nature of Science in 
an Authentic Context: An Explicit Approach to Bridging the Gap Between Nature of Science and Scientific 
Inquiry,” Science Education 88, no. 4 (2004): 611.  
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effective classroom practice.23 Empirical evidence from such studies suggests a number 
of similar findings which include the idea that both students and teachers generally hold 
naïve views with regards to NOS and that pedagogy emphasizing inquiry learning 
coupled with explicit instruction in history, philosophy, and sociology of science, and 
reflective practice affords students and teachers the best opportunity for developing 
desired NOS understandings.24 Consequently, these researchers claim that NOS should be 
given equal status to that of subject matter when considering curriculum objectives and 
teacher preparation.25 
The rationale behind such a privileging of NOS closely mirrors that touted by 
advocates of universal scientific literacy. For example, some note that “science educators 
have come to believe that if students understand the source and limits of scientific 
knowledge they will be better equipped to make informed decisions about personal and 
societal problems that are scientifically-based.”26 Others propose five significant reasons 
as grounds for elevating the position of NOS considerations in K-12 pedagogy: to 
enhance learning of science content, to enhance understanding of science, to enhance 
interest in science, to enhance decision making, and to enhance instructional delivery. 
Historically, the resurgence of NOS discourse in the literature in some form for ninety or 
                                                 
23 See for example, William McComas, ed., The Nature of Science in Science Education (Los Angeles, CA: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998). 
24 Inquiry learning has been characterized as equally ambiguous in the science education literature as 
scientific literacy and nature of science. For an overview of current discourse surrounding inquiry in 
science education see Fouad Abd-El-Khalick, Saouma Boujaoude, Richard Duschl, Norman Lederman, 
Rachel Mamlok-Naaman, Avi Hofstein, Mansoor Diaz, David Treagust, and Hsiao-lin Tuan, “Inquiry in 
Science Education: International Perspectives,” Science Education 88, no.3 (2004): 397-419. 
25 Renee Schwartz, Norman Lederman, and Tom Thompson, “Grade Nine Students’ Views of Nature of 
Science and Scientific Inquiry: The Effects of an Inquiry-Enthusiast’s Approach to Teaching Science as 
Inquiry,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Association for Research in Science 
Teaching, St. Louis, MO (2001): 3-4. 
26 Ibid., 22. 
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more years attests to its significance with regard to science education.27 I contend, 
however, that the nature of such discourse is questionable insofar as it seemingly favors 
an educational philosophy grounded on a set of epistemological assumptions that could 
result in directly transmitting the same information to students and possibly foreclosing 
their own understanding of science.28 A view of understanding predicated on a 
continuous fusion of horizons between the familiarity of a knower, in this case the 
student, and the strangeness of a text, nature-of-science considerations, can conceivably 
extend the scholarship pertaining to NOS pedagogy in K-12 schools. The next section of 
this introduction briefly explains the evolution of such a view as maintained by the 
German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in the 20th century.    
The Development of Philosophical Hermeneutics 
In an effort to compare a variety of perspectives regarding student understanding 
in educational contexts, this analysis considers the evolution of the discipline of 
hermeneutics itself, focusing primarily on a period of history beginning with the late 18th 
century, that led to the development of philosophical hermeneutics as posited by 
Gadamer. As with Chladenius and other pre-romantic hermeneuts, the practice of 
hermeneutics delineated between interpretation and understanding, where the former 
sought to rid a text of impediments to achieving the latter, in an effort to understand the 
                                                 
27 Norman Lederman, “Students’ and Teachers’ Conceptions of the Nature of Science: A Review of the 
Research,” Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29 (1992): 331-359; and Robin Millar and Jonathan 
Osborne, Beyond 2000: Science Education for the Future: A Report with Ten Recommendations (London: 
King’s College Press, 1998).  
28 While this particular idea will be explored throughout the subsequent pages of this dissertation, I wish 
here to briefly address the possibility of foreclosing understanding by adhering to either a consensus view 
of NOS or an explicit attempt to teach for NOS understandings. Regardless of the pedagogical methods 
used in the learning situation (i.e. didactic teaching, inquiry learning, etc.), I contend that the language used 
by NOS scholars and science education policy advocates connotes particular epistemological assumptions 
that narrowly confines understanding to a form of cognition. One of the major efforts of this dissertation is 
to further characterize and evaluate this perspective.   
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true meaning of the text itself.29 The work of Schleiermacher, however, in developing an 
art of understanding beyond a collection of observations, as in the case of inductivism in 
the natural sciences, inaugurated a universal project of understanding detached from all 
content and recognized by Gadamer as fundamentally different from his predecessors.30 
Here the concept of misunderstanding replaced a lack of understanding, and 
interpretation itself became a problem of understanding. For Schleiermacher, the 
reproductive act involved in understanding a text moves beyond words and their 
respective meanings to include the individuality of the author of that same text, with the 
objective of understanding the author better than he understands himself.31 Gadamer 
further suggests that perhaps for the first time the interpreter could claim superiority over 
his object in that “neither the saving truth of Scripture nor the exemplariness of the 
classics was to influence a procedure that was able to grasp every text as an expression of 
life and ignore the truth of what was said.”32 
In the middle of the 19th century, Dilthey expounded the romantic ideal of 
hermeneutics into a historical method and sought to require the same justification for the 
human sciences as was constitutive of pure reason as characterized by Kant.33 As such, 
just as  
                                                 
29 TM, 184. Here Gadamer explains the preromantic literary hermeneutic experience as one predicated on 
point of view and the true meaning of the subject matter itself (as opposed to focusing on the mens auctoris 
or original intention of the author).  
30 John Connolly and Thomas Keutner, Hermeneutics vs. Science? Three German Views (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 9-12. 
31 TM, 186, 192. See for example, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, 
trans. J. Duke and J. Forstman (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977). 
32 TM, 197. 
33 Ibid., 219-221. For Gadamer, Kant’s attempt to challenge metaphysics as a rational science and replace it 
with a pure science based on a mathematico-scientific epistemology in Critique of Pure Reason provides a 
framework within which to examine the analogous attempt of Dilthey to reframe the discourse on historical 
reason. See for example, Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Rise of Hermeneutics,” trans. Fredric Jameson, New 
Literary History 3 (1972): 229-244.  
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…the essence of the experimental method consists in rising above the subjective 
fortuitousness of observation and with the help of method attaining knowledge of 
natural laws, for Dilthey, the human sciences endeavor to rise methodologically 
above the subjective fortuitousness of their own standpoint in history through 
tradition accessible to them, and thus attain objective historical knowledge.34 
 
Dilthey’s work was predicated on a view of understanding that, epistemologically 
speaking, involves verification, falsification, and confirmation of Geisteswissenchaften, 
which identifies meaning with the subjective intention of the author.35 While perhaps 
suggestive of espousing an idealistic metaphysics which claims an a priori meaning of a 
text, Dilthey attempted to situate the problem of understanding in hermeneutics rather 
than psychology so as to retain the historical worldview and guard against the objection 
of relativism. In fact, Gadamer contends that “he [Dilthey] knew that in the evolution of 
historical self-reflection leading him from relativity to relativity, he was on the way 
toward the absolute.”36 In Dilthey, as well as in the romantic hermeneutics of 
Schleiermacher, the apparent vagueness of thought concerning a subjective knower and 
an objective text is rooted in an unresolved Cartesianism that “expects the uncertainty 
and unsureness of life to be overcome not so much by the stability of the experience that 
life itself provides but by science.”37 Both favored the application of a strict, universal 
method for the human sciences that strives to eliminate the subjective bias of experience 
in an attempt to understand the meaning of a text. This completeness of understanding is 
similar, although not entirely analogous, to the notion of objectivity in the natural 
sciences.    
                                                 
34 TM, 236. 
35 Connolly and Keutner, Hermeneutics vs. Science, 14-15. 
36 TM, 237. 
37 Ibid., 239. 
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Both Schleiermacher and Dilthey espouse a form of methodological alienation of 
the subject from his relation to the past in an effort to free himself from the prejudices 
associated with his own historicity. Here, the situation of the knower can only have a 
negative value that the interpreter must attempt to transcend.38 It was not until Heidegger, 
following the phenomenological impetus begun by Husserl at the turn of the 20th century, 
that hermeneutics developed its fundamentally ontological character in Dasein, which is 
concerned with being. With the purpose of renewing the question of being in general 
rather than producing a theory of the human sciences, Heidegger’s Being and Time 
transcended the work of his predecessors in challenging Cartesian metaphysics and its 
insistence on privileging the notion of objectivity by attempting to separate the subject 
from the prejudices of his tradition and experiences.39  
Understanding is not a resigned ideal of human experience adopted in the old age 
of the spirit, as with Dilthey, nor is it, as with Husserl, a last methodological ideal 
of philosophy in contrast to the naivete of unreflecting life; it is, on the contrary, 
the original form of the realization of Dasein, which is being in the world.40 
 
As such, Heidegger posited a mode of being for both the knower and the known as the 
center of inquiry that interprets all understanding as self-understanding and a projection 
of the knower himself upon his possibilities.  
Rather than expounding on the nature of being and thinking, but nevertheless 
furthering the value of the prejudice-structure introduced by Heidegger, Gadamer situates 
his discourse in hermeneutics on the historical nature of tradition and understanding, now 
freed from the impediments of scientific objectivity. As such, the ontological (as opposed 
                                                 
38 David E. Linge, ed., Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 
xiv. This work will be cited as PH in the text for all subsequent references.  
39 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1967). 
40 TM, 259. 
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to subjective) situations of the knower and the object constitute productive ground for all 
understanding which resides not in a reconstruction of the past but rather in a mediation 
between the past and the present, “… a comprehensive horizon in which the limited 
horizons of text and interpreter are fused into a common view of the subject matter-the 
meaning- with which both are concerned.”41 In order to further explicate this fusion of 
horizons that is central to this present study, Chapter Two includes a brief introduction to 
the salient elements of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, each of which has been referenced in 
educational philosophy and has the potential for reconceptualizing student understanding 
of NOS. What follows here is an introductory discussion of how these principles have 
influenced the concept of understanding in both educational philosophy and science 
education.  
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Educational Scholarship 
Philosophy of Education 
A select number of scholars have explored the implications of philosophical 
hermeneutics for the field of general education. One notable philosopher of education, 
Padraig Hogan, identifies six themes that emerge from the writings of Gadamer that he 
believes have the potential for transforming educational practice: the primacy of play, the 
principle of effective-history, the predisposing of thought by language, the plurality of 
tradition, the fusion of horizons, and the dialogue that we are. He suggests that 
understanding as embodying these components is oftentimes stifled and discouraged in 
educational settings influenced by rational, positivist Western philosophy. For example, 
he interprets the fusion of horizons to be “not a melting together in which all tensions are 
                                                 
41 PH, xix. 
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laid to rest, but an attentive to-and-fro between the otherness of that which addresses the 
learner.”42 Thus pedagogy is viewed not so much as a means of transmitting knowledge 
and values but rather as “…an interplay with overt and unseen consequences.”43 
Gallagher provides arguably the most comprehensive scholarship relating 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics to educational philosophy. In his seminal piece, Hermeneutics 
and Education, he identifies philosophical hermeneutics with a moderate view of 
education, as distinct from espousing either a conservative, critical, modernist, or radical 
view of understanding. He compares a Gadamerian view of understanding with that 
espoused by more conservative hermeneuts with regards to the hermeneutic circle, the 
notion of objectivity, and the act of reproduction involved in interpretation. Seeming to 
take their lead from the ideals posited by Romantic hermeneuts such as Schleiermacher 
and Dilthey, individuals with a more conservative view of understanding attempt to reach 
full understanding through the completion of the hermeneutic circle.44 Whereas the whole 
determines the parts but is itself determined by those same parts (as in the case of Biblical 
exegesis), complete understanding can be achieved as a result of the continuous back and 
forth between these two primary constituents of understanding, the whole and its parts. 
Similarly, whereas the systematic application of a controlled set of methods cannot lead 
to absolute truth, for the conservative hermeneut, objective understanding is possible 
through the use of a prescriptive set of canons. As such, the primacy of procedure is 
accepted as a means of reproducing the original meaning in the object under study. 
                                                 
42 Padraig Hogan, “Gadamer and the Philosophy of Education,” 
http://www.ffst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/gadamer.htm, (2000), Accessed 20 December 2007.  
43 Ibid. 
44 See for example Emilio Betti, “Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften,” 
trans. Josef Bleicher, in J. Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Books, 1980); and Edward D. Hirsch, Jr., The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976).  
16 
 
Gallagher notes, however, that for the conservative hermenuet, there may be a difference 
between understanding and meaning making, the former concerning that nature of the 
original meaning that exists in the text itself which is ascertainable through the methods 
described above, the latter relating to the particular significance of the text for the 
interpreter which is not amenable to such conservative views of understanding.45  
In his consideration of the relationship between critical hermeneutics and 
philosophical hermeneutics, Gallagher focuses his analysis on the act of reproduction and 
the concepts of hegemony, habitus, and critical reflection. While the critical perspective 
is evident in the writings of Marx, Freud and numerous other scholars, Gallagher uses 
primarily the conversations that took place between Gagdamer and Jurgen Habermas to 
compare/contrast these two perspectives. Habermas challenged Gadamer’s contention 
concerning the universality of hermeneutics, using as an example the monological nature-
of-science as compared to the constitutive dialogical component inherent in a 
hermeneutical understanding of understanding.46 But the primary difference between 
critical and moderate hermeneutics, according to Gallagher, involves the insistence of the 
former on striving for some form of emancipation through neutralizing the language of 
the text that seeks to reinforce or reproduce the traditional power structures. Such a 
liberation is possible only through critical reflection that attempts to acknowledge the 
extrahermeneutical factors involved in understanding, which Habermas contends that 
Gadamder fails to do.47 For the critical hermeneut, the absence of this type of reflection 
                                                 
45 HE, 205-213.  
46 See Jurgen Habermas, “The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality,” in Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. 
Schrift, eds., The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricouer (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990). 
47 HE, 261-275.  
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results in a form of hegemony and a reproduction of a given habitus.48 On the other hand, 
when included in the practice of interpretation, critical reflection can lead to an 
ideologically-neutral, objective understanding of a given text.  
Lastly, Gallagher compares the views of more radical hermeneuts, such as 
Foucault and Derrida, with those of Gadamer, this time emphasizing the concepts of 
textuality, play, and radical suspicion. Unlike conservative and even critical perspectives 
that believe that objective understanding is possible, the former through methodological 
control and the latter through critical reflection, the radical view seems to eschew any 
form of principles and/or canons that would attempt to reach objective meaning. 
Focusing on the writings of Derrida,49 Gallagher represents the radical perspective as on 
the one hand positing the non-existence of any form of justification for interpretation 
while on the other hand not entirely favoring a completely arbitrary process of meaning 
making. Herein lies the notion of textuality which limits the possible interpretations of a 
text by confining the interpreter to the language of the text itself. For Derrida, however, 
language is part of the play of the text, and as such holds no objective value. Unlike the 
critical hermeneuts who focus on the entrahermeneutical factors involved in 
understanding, such as power, authority, and tradition, the radical hermeneut does not 
look either internally (to the interpreter) or externally (outside of the text). Gallagher 
contends that the notion of play as described by Derrida results in a hermeneutics of 
suspicion that rejects any belief in the possibility of objective meaning and/or truth in the 
                                                 
48 For a discussion of habitus see Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, 
Society, and Culture, trans. Richard Nice (London: Sage Publications, 1977).  
49 See for example, Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayarti Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); and Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978).  
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interpretation and simultaneously challenges what he describes as a type of conversation 
and dialogue predicated on a Kantian view of metaphysics.50  
The above discussion addresses the major themes that emerge in Gallagher’s 
comparison of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics with those that are more 
conservative, critical, and radical. How then does he consider the former’s position to be 
moderate when compared to the others? According to Gallagher, Gadamer would 
consider complete objective meaning (conservative and critical) and emancipation 
(critical) to represent two unattainable extremes. He does not necessarily deny that 
neither is in part possible but he does not make the distinction between understanding and 
significance, as in the case of the conservatives, nor does he think it is possible to entirely 
transcend the notion of false consciousness and hermeneutical bias, as in the case of the 
critical scholars. Similarly, Gadamer does not favor exclusively the act of reproduction in 
an effort to reconstruct original meaning (conservatives) or ideologically-neutral meaning 
(critical), but rather suggests that meaning making is primarily a constructive and 
secondarily a reconstructive act. Unlike the radical hermeneuts who emphasize the notion 
of textuality that leads to a hermeneutics of suspicion and the conservative hermeneuts 
who strive to eliminate the influence of the interpreter’s own situation with regards to 
understanding a text, Gadamer favors the concept of a dialogue of trust between the 
horizon of the interpreter and that of the object. 
Aiming to use the educational experience over traditional textual analysis as a 
model for Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Gallagher further explains learning in terms of the 
interchange of a variety of non-coinciding interpretations, such as student-teacher, 
                                                 
50 HE, 277-317.  
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student-subject, and teacher-subject. As such, teachers espousing a hermeneutic 
consciousness remain open to the possibilities of interchange and interpretations that 
subsequently follow. Understanding is not considered as a narrowly defined, 
epistemological cognition but rather an existentially comprehensive as well as 
constrained and ongoing activity in which we already find ourselves engaged, a 
characteristic distinguishing human existence, or Dasein. Rather than expound on the 
prescriptive nature of educational constructs such as questioning, application, and self-
understanding, Gallagher situates his considerations of education in hermeneutics in an 
attempt to project their meaning into the traditional discourse of educational 
philosophers.     
While Gallagher supports the position of others who suggest an element of 
familiarity between the writings of progressive educators and Gadamer in terms of ideas 
such as questioning and fore-structures, he is careful to distinguish between their 
respective considerations of notions such as productivity and application. Whereas 
modernists and progressives seemingly overemphasize methodological procedures, 
reduce all learning to problem solving (techné) and explain productivity in terms of 
inventiveness and application in terms of utility, philosophical hermeneutics regards 
understanding to be exemplified in the Greek’s notion of phronesis, which, he purports, 
involves a self-knowledge not needed for techné and as such cannot be methodologically 
instilled in students.51 For Gallagher then, Gadamer’s hermeneutics rejects the modernist 
                                                 
51 The supposed relationship between techné and phronesis, as explicated by Aristotle in his Ethics and 
appropriated by Gadamer in his hermeneutics, has been thoroughly discussed by several notable 
educational philosophers. The two important texts that are used in the present analysis are Gallagher, 
Hermeneutics and Education and Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘Phronesis’ and ‘Techné’ in 
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tendency to reduce education to a set of techniques which simply allow us to manage 
information. Instead he favors opportunities that place the student’s own possibilities at 
stake and provide the necessary resistance to encourage the student to project himself 
onto the tradition of which he is a part. As such, education becomes something that 
achieves culture rather than something that is achieved by culture. 52 
Similarly offering a compelling interpretation of the potential for incorporating 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics into educational praxis, Kerdeman elaborates on and evaluates 
Gallagher’s delineation between a Cartesian and hermeneutical (along the lines of 
Heidegger and later Gadamer) view of understanding.53 Rather than subscribing to the 
former’s insistence on a subject/object dualism that relegates all understanding to 
epistemology, the latter considers understanding as an ontological way of being. She 
recalls how for the hermeneut “meaning is not something that has to be produced 
methodically; nor is understanding an outcome we deliberately set out to achieve…it is a 
mode of ordinary practical experience.”54 She differentiates as well between what she 
terms pre-reflective and clear understanding, the former pertaining solely to the familiar, 
the latter attempting to negotiate with the strange. As opposed to traditional 
hermeneutics, existential hermeneutics does not consider this strangeness as an objective 
dilemma that we attempt to overcome but rather as part of human existence through 
which we live. For Kerdeman, clear understanding is not to be mistaken for complete 
understanding as sought by the earlier traditions in hermeneutics but rather is comprised 
                                                                                                                                                 
Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). This last 
reference will be cited as RG in all subsequent notes.  
52 Ibid., 170-200.  
53 Kerdeman, “Hermeneutics and Education,” 245-248. 
54 Ibid., 248-249. 
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of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons and its constitutive interchange between the strange and 
the familiar.  
The crux of Kerdeman’s position, however, involves ameliorating the supposed 
tension touted by Gallagher and other proponents of existential hermeneutics between the 
modernist view of education and one that recognizes the situatedness of the learner: “In 
sum, while the epistemological subject is self-sufficient and detached, the hermeneutic 
being is ensnared and engaged.”55 She believes that Gadamer’s approach to 
understanding de-centers without altogether negating individual control by encouraging 
the individual to remain open, thereby denying “neither our efficacy nor our finitude.”56 
Furthermore, according to Kerdeman, Gadamer believed this life-orientation could be 
addressed in education by enabling students to encounter differences and challenging 
their assumptions, both of which can succeed only in the presence of teachers who 
themselves possess this disposition of openness.57 
Narrow Lines of Inquiry 
Whereas the aforementioned scholars concerned themselves with how 
philosophical hermeneutics relates to the broader context of philosophy of education, 
others have narrowed their focus on their respective lines of academic inquiry. A brief 
mention of their work here provides further evidence for considering the potential of 
situating educational discourse in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. With particular attention 
given to the practice of deconstructing a text, Crusius offers philosophical hermeneutics 
as a viable alternative to Derrida’s hermeneutics of suspicion for teachers of English 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 257. 
56 Ibid., 263. 
57 Ibid., 264. 
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language.58 He begins his analysis with a thorough explication of various types of 
hermeneutics and compares their respective developments with a similar evolution within 
the philosophy of science. Crusius employs the Heideggerian notion of Dasein (human 
being in the world) to acknowledge our own historicity in engaging with a particular text. 
Since truth is dependent on Dasein and Dasein depends on being with others, he situates 
the earlier writing of Plato and Hegel with regards to dialogue as inquiry and a dialectical 
understanding of the truth, respectively, into Gadamer’s hermeneutics. He contends that 
such an approach to textual deconstruction enables the listener/reader to construct 
meaning anew, together with the other, through a dialogue that moves in both directions, 
particularly when the interpreter is in tension-filled proximity with the text.  
This dialogical nature of understanding involved in hermeneutics, coupled with a 
Deweyan conception of democracy, is attended to by Garrison in his attempt to suggest a 
hermeneutical approach for democratic listening.59 The author notes that due to the 
ontological nature of openness as espoused by Gadamer, “… to listen well, we must 
actively strive to understand the meanings of others in their terms.”60 Simultaneously, the 
impartial listener ceases to exist as do prejudices against prejudices since “the point is not 
to free ourselves of all prejudice, but to examine our historically inherited and 
unreflectively held prejudices, and alter those that disable our efforts to understand 
others, and ourselves.”61 Garrison dismisses the idea of sympathetic listening as a viable 
                                                 
58 Timothy Crusius, A Teacher’s Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (Urbana, IL: NCTE Press, 
1991), 2-4. In this text, the author actually distinguishes between what he understands to be five different 
levels of hermeneutic discourse: naïve/natural, normative, scientific, philosophical/hermeneutical, and 
negative/depth. Derrida serves as an exemplar for the last of these.  
59 Jim Garrison, “A Deweyan Theory of Democratic Listening,” Educational Theory 46, no. 4 (1996): 429-
451. 
60 Ibid., 433. 
61 Ibid., 434. 
23 
 
option along hermeneutic lines in that it relies on objectivity, the setting aside of fore-
knowledge, and attempts to only reproduce the meaning of the other. His emphasis on 
such an approach to listening seeks to foster a critical form of education that challenges 
“the assumption that truth and goodness will prevail so long as everyone can speak their 
mind.”62 Whereas the preceding two references serve as exemplars describing the use of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics in specific contexts involved in educational practice, the next 
section situates such discourse in the field of science education, the area of focus of the 
present study.      
Science Education 
There appears to be a limited body of research in the science education literature 
pertaining to the use of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a theoretical framework. Martin Eger 
published a series of articles positing the use of hermeneutics as an appropriate 
theoretical framework for science education.63 He incorporates the Gadamerian notions 
of positive prejudice-structures and interpretations as being constructions rather than 
reconstructions to address the meaning students make out of science as it is learned in 
educational settings, as opposed to directly from nature itself. As such, he uses the work 
of others relating to students preconceptions,64 which can be likened to Kerdeman’s pre-
reflective understandings,65 to exemplify the potential for hermeneutics in addressing 
how students interpret science through the fusion of horizons (that involving the ‘fore-
having’ and that of the text itself). He ultimately questions, however, the dichotomy in 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 438. 
63 Martin Eger, “Hermeneutics and Science Education: An Introduction,” Science & Education 1, no. 1 
(1992): 337-348; and Martin Eger, “Hermeneutics as an Approach to Science: Part I,” Science & Education 
2, no. 1 (1993): 1-29. 
64 See for example Joseph Novak, A Theory of Education (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977). 
65 Kerdeman, “Hermeneutics and Education,” 249-252. 
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understanding established by constituents of both the natural and human/social sciences 
to prevent against relativism on the one hand and scientism on the other. Sociologists of 
science suggest that the writings of the preeminent philosophers of science well into the 
20th century privileged scientific knowledge while they themselves largely represent the 
postmodern perspective that has arguably challenged the objectivity of a scientific 
epistemology.66 Eger instead contends that the scientists’ reading of nature and the 
students’ reading of science both involve an understanding of a text that is beyond the 
horizon of the interpreter and as such can be considered as a hermeneutic aporia.67   
Focusing less on the prejudice structures inherent in understanding, Sammel 
applies the dialogical, intersubjective component of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the study 
of teacher meaning-making and critical environmental education.68 Considering that the 
“goal of dialogue, for Gadamer, is to reach an understanding that centers less on asserting 
one’s point of view and more on individual transformation,”69 she contends that high 
school teacher understanding, and understanding in general, is not contingent upon 
“correctly” identifying the other but rather develops at the center of the “dialogical 
interplay.”70 She aligns her research method with the hermeneutic practice of de-
centering the author of the text, both the text of her research and that of environmental 
education, in an effort to allow for the co-production of meaning, both with regards to her 
analysis and the participants’ understanding of environmental education.     
                                                 
66 Turner and Sullenger, “Kuhn in the Classroom,” 8-9. The discord between the significance of the various 
sciences has of course not only concerned contemporary scholars but dates back to at least the quarrels 
between the ancients and the moderns as explained in the translator’s introduction of Vicos’ Study 
Methods. 
67 Eger, “Hermeneutics and Science Education,” 344-346. 
68 Ali Sammel, “An Invitation to Dialogue: Gadamer, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, and Critical 
Environmental Education,” Canadian Journal of Environmental Education 8, no. 1 (2003): 155-168.   
69 Ibid., 159. 
70 Ibid., 160. 
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Most recently, Borda examines the implications of philosophical hermeneutics for 
developing particular dispositions in science students.71 To do so, she establishes the 
notion of a hermeneutic consciousness from Gadamer’s way of being that “allows us to 
become more aware of our human limitations and finitude.”72 Similarly, she subscribes to 
the hermeneutic commitment to consider understanding not as a cognitive achievement 
but rather as developing through “…a certain orientation to situations which challenge 
our preconceptions.”73 From his address given at the University of Leipzig in 1947, 
Borda ascertains Gadamer’s hermeneutic scientist to espouse absent-mindedness, doubt, 
and humility, some of which have been characterized elsewhere74 but for hermeneutics 
serve as understanding itself and not a method for understanding. She also augments 
these three dispositions with that of strength which she believes epitomizes the 
hermeneutic ideal of remaining rooted in the familiar and not losing site of one’s own 
views while enabling one to remain open-minded in the presence of the strange.   
The Study 
Whereas the primary science education reform documents of the 1990s together 
with the body of scholarly research emerging since that time continue to play an integral 
role in shaping 21st century national and state standards, NOS considerations have 
perhaps influenced only to a limited degree the decisions of individual classroom teachers 
regarding student understanding of the scientific worldview, science inquiry, and the 
scientific enterprise. At the same time, some education scholars have cautioned against 
                                                 
71 Emily Borda, “Applying Gadamer’s Concept of Disposition to Science and Science Education,” Science 
& Education 16, no. 1 (2007): 1027-1041. 
72 Ibid., 1030. 
73 Ibid., 1031. 
74 See for example John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1916); and 
Ron Ritchhart, “From IQ to IC: A Dispositional View of Intelligence,” Roeper Review 23, no. 3 (2001): 
143-150. 
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overemphasizing the seemingly shortsighted contention that NOS understandings, and 
scientific literacy more broadly, are integral to individual intellectual development, 
national security, and a democratic way of life.75 Likewise others have suggested “that 
whatever the nature of (research) science, that ‘nature’ offers no legitimate warrant for 
the claim that the needs of students, or society, or the scientific enterprise itself, are best 
served” by explicit NOS instruction in the classroom.76 While questioning the 
justification for any comprehensive reform effort is necessary, such a discussion is 
beyond the scope of the present concern. Instead, since NOS has received significant 
attention as a national curriculum objective, it is worthwhile to consider the philosophical 
assumptions inherent in currently held beliefs with regards to student understanding of 
NOS concepts which, I ultimately intend to suggest, remain seemingly rooted in the 
Cartesian tradition and subsequent Enlightenment ideal that equate understanding with 
epistemological cognition.77 Such a view has the potential to reduce NOS pedagogy to 
the direct transmission of information, possibly resulting in a form of indoctrination and 
subsequently foreclosing rather than enlarging student understanding. A related question 
then, which is the primary focus of this study, is whether Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers 
science education scholars and practitioners with an ontological view of understanding 
that can be used to reframe the discourse surrounding NOS teaching and learning in the 
K-12 curriculum.     
                                                 
75 See DeBoer, “Scientific Literacy” and Shamos, The Myth of Scientific Literacy. 
76 See Turner and Sullenger, “Kuhn in the Classroom,” 25. 
77 Again, the present philosophical analysis focuses on the nature of understanding, not the nature of 
science. For a discussion on the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions in the various NOS tenets 
see Brian Alters, “Whose Nature of Science?” Journal of Research in Science Teaching 34, no.1 (1997): 
39-55; Michael Matthews, “Constructivism and Science Education: A Further Appraisal,” Journal of 
Science Education and Technology 11, no.2 (2002): 121-134; and Patricia Harding and William Hare, 
“Portraying Science Accurately in the Classroom: Emphasizing Open-Mindedness Rather than Relativism,” 
Journal of Research in Science Teaching 37, no.3 (2000): 225-236. 
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A study of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics has numerous implications for 
NOS pedagogy as well as for the broader field of science education. First, such a study 
questions the epistemological assumptions behind the teaching of either a consensus or 
desired view of NOS, often purported in the science education literature. In fact, several 
education scholars now contend that the “scientific endeavor is looking more like a 
mosaic of disciplines with a host of ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
commitments, than a unified and homogeneous entity.”78 Simultaneously, teaching 
students to understand and/or accept a prescribed set of objectives that epitomize 
scientific knowledge claims and the processes used to arrive at such statements can all 
too easily become a form of indoctrination, enculturation, or adjudication.79 Stemming 
from such opposition, various authors have encouraged scholars and practitioners to 
sincerely reflect on the role of education and the responsibility of educators.80  
In that vein, then, I endeavor to use Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to inquire into 
student understanding of NOS concepts. Whereas there is an abundance of literature 
examining how such understandings relate to particular tenets posited to be representative 
of a consensus or desired view of NOS, there is an absence of scholarship pertaining to 
the concept of understanding itself. Chapter Two explains the approach used in the study, 
further addressing the particular themes of philosophical hermeneutics that serve as the 
                                                 
78 Fouad Abd-El-Khalick, et al., “Inquiry in Science Education ,” 416. 
79 At least three different perspectives have been used to argue against teaching a consensus, desired view 
of NOS. Michael Matthews, “In Defense of Modest Goals When Teaching about Nature of Science,” 
Journal of Research in Science Teaching 35, no. 2 (1998): 161-174 challenges the ontological assumptions 
inherent in NOS pedagogy. Wolff-Michael Roth, “’Enculturation’: Acquisition of Conceptual Blindspots 
and Epistemological Prejudices,” British Educational Research Journal 27, no.1 (2001): 5-27 questions the 
reproduction of a specific habitus through NOS teaching and learning. John Rudolph, “Reconsidering the 
‘Nature of Science’ as a Curriculum Component,” Journal of Curriculum Studies 32, no.3 (2000): 403-419 
addresses the curricular consequences of teaching a general, consensus view of NOS.   
80 See for example Don Margetson, “Some Educational Implications of the Uncertain Identity of Science,” 
European Journal of Science Education 4, no.4 (1982): 357-365. 
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basis for the inquiry. Chapter Three contains a description of both the rationale 
supporting the inclusion of NOS considerations in national reform efforts as well as a 
more detailed account of the body of empirical research that has resulted from such an 
inclusion. In Chapter Four, I explicate the various philosophical assumptions inherent in 
the use of the concept of understanding in the literature and policy documents, while in 
Chapters Five and Six, I incorporate the Gadamerian concepts of fore-structure, 
prejudice, temporal distance, and history of effect together with the problem of 
application, experience, and the priority of the question into the discourse pertaining to 
student understanding of NOS. Chapter Seven offers a discussion of the positive value of 
considering Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a referent for both student understanding of NOS 
and the scholarly discourse surrounding that understanding. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INQUIRY 
 
The present inquiry involves a philosophical analysis of the nature of student 
understanding in science education. Such an analysis is comprised of a number of 
interrelated activities, namely conceptual clarification and differentiation, an examination 
of the assumptions held by science education researchers and educators concerning 
nature-of-science (NOS) pedagogy, and an appeal to the tradition of hermeneutics to shed 
light on the discourse surrounding student understanding in educational praxis.81 By 
considering what student understanding entails and explicating the various possible 
philosophical underpinnings implicit in interpreting understanding, I examine how this 
particular construct is used in the context of NOS teaching and learning and consider the 
implications of that usage for theory and practice, with the intention of remaining open to 
a more phronetic rather than technical form of inquiry, as incorporated into Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics and summarized as a philosophy that does not: 
… meet the criteria of theory as epistemé or sophia. Its subject matter will not 
permit the same degree of exactness that we should expect to find elsewhere - in 
mathematics, for example. This subject matter contains so much variety and 
fluctuation that a theoretical account of it can be given only “roughly and in 
outline” and can do no more than hint at what is true “for the most part.”82 
 
                                                 
81 For a categorical discussion of the use and respective value of such analyses in teacher education, see 
Margaret Buchmann and Robert E. Floden, “On Doing Philosophy of Teacher Education,” Oxford Review 
of Education 16, no.3 (1990): 343-366. 
82 RG, 243. 
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While I aim to provide a thorough inquiry into the possibility of including philosophical 
hermeneutics into NOS considerations, I recognize the seemingly inherent limitations to 
such a study and anticipate to leave “…the reader with more questions to be asked, and 
with doubts and unclarities that remain.”83        
Introduction to the Aporia 
The purpose of this study is to suggest the use of a hermeneutical view of 
understanding, as proposed by Gadamer, as a referent for student understanding of 
nature-of-science (NOS). My central argument is reinforced by a number of primary 
premises. Firstly, I contend that current views on the teaching and learning of NOS are 
predicated on a particular notion of understanding, whose inherent assumptions have yet 
to be analyzed for their philosophical import. Secondly, scholarship by philosophers 
proper as well as philosophers of education in the field of hermeneutics suggests that 
certain pedagogical practices may limit rather than allow for the development of student 
understanding. Lastly, I suggest that a Gadamerian view of understanding, unlike the 
dominant Cartesian, technical view arguably implicit in the majority of the NOS 
literature and reform efforts, has the potential for enlarging student understanding of 
NOS.84 While a consideration of the use of philosophical hermeneutics has been 
discussed by only a limited number of philosophers of education, its inclusion in the 
science education literature is even sparser.  Here I hope to make an original contribution 
                                                 
83 Buchmann and Floden, “On Doing Philosophy,” 364. These same authors contend that “…examining the 
normative and conceptual underpinnings of social practice is like repairing a ship at sea. Only a few parts 
can be prized out at any one time,” 363. 
84 Whereas a hermeneutic approach to understanding (and subsequently education) will be contrasted with 
the degenerations of Descartes’ cogito and Aristotle’s techné at various levels throughout this dissertation, 
it is assumed here that understanding for these latter two is equivalent to reason and narrowly defined as 
epistemological cognition in the case of the former and expert know-how in the case of the latter. See HE, 
39-45.  
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to the field of science education by incorporating an ontological view of understanding 
into the discourse surrounding NOS pedagogy as well as to participate in the broader 
discussion pertaining to the educational implications inherent in a hermeneutical view of 
teaching and learning.  
 In an attempt to perpetuate late 20th century, curriculum reform efforts that 
favored minimum standards for all students, sought to prepare an effective citizenry, and 
aimed at teaching for increased appreciation for science and technology, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science published its seminal Benchmarks for 
Science Literacy positing: 
When people know how scientists go about their work and reach scientific 
conclusions, and what the limitations of such conclusions are, they are more likely 
to react thoughtfully to scientific claims and less likely to reject them out of hand 
or accept them uncritically. The images that many people have of science and 
how it works are often distorted. Hence the study of science as a way of knowing 
needs to be made explicit in the curriculum.85 
 
As a result of the ensuing imperative to teach a science for all Americans, renewed 
emphasis was afforded to nature-of-science considerations in the development of both 
school curriculum and lines of inquiry in the field of science education.86 Concerning the 
latter, researchers primarily focused their investigations on either establishing a set of 
tenets representing a consensus view of NOS or assessing the effectiveness of particular 
                                                 
85 AAAS, Benchmarks, 3.  
86 As discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, insofar as NOS understandings may be integral to the 
larger notion of scientific literacy, such considerations are evident in the literature and reform documents 
throughout the 20th century. See, for example, John Rudolph, “Epistemology for the Masses: The Origins of 
the Scientific Method in American Schools,” History of Education Quarterly 45, no. 3 (2005): 341-376 for 
a discussion of the portrayal of the scientific method in the 1920s and 1930s. See also Fenstermacher, “The 
Nature of Science and Its Uses for Education” for a discussion of the import of Joseph Schwab’s work, 
pertaining to nature of science, through the 1960s.  
32 
 
pedagogical efforts to improve student and teacher understandings of NOS.87 Although 
several scholars seemingly recognized conceptions of NOS as being tentative and 
historical and subsequently cautioned against considering any one set as better than any 
other, their work in examining the particular approaches used to teach NOS continued to 
be predicated on the notion of a desired, valid, mature, or adequate understanding of NOS 
considerations.88  
While the scholarship garnered from the efforts of such investigations may indeed 
be valuable in terms of its relationship to the aforementioned objectives espoused by 
adherents of science for all Americans, I contend that it presumes a particular 
understanding of understanding that may limit rather than allow for its development. To 
date, there is an absence of any serious philosophical analysis pertaining to the idea of 
understanding in the science education literature.89 Several philosophers of education, 
however, have expounded on both the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of 
such constructs when considered in light of educational praxis. Notable among these 
contributions is Shawn Gallagher’s Hermeneutics and Education in which the author, 
using Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a “theory which illuminates the conditions of 
                                                 
87 For an example of research centered on a consensus view of NOS, see William McComas, Hiya 
Almazroa, and Michael Clough, “The Nature of Science in Science Education: An Introduction,” Science 
Education 7, no. 6 (1998): 511-532. For an example of research evaluating NOS understandings, see Fouad 
Abd-El-Khalick and Norman Lederman, “Improving Science Teachers’ Conceptions of Nature of Science: 
A Critical Review of the Literature,” International Journal of Science Education 22, no. 7 (2000): 665-701. 
88 Abd-El-Khalick and Norman Lederman, 667-670. 
89 The issues surrounding the teaching and learning of evolution seem to encourage a periodic consideration 
of the conceptualization of the idea of understanding, together with knowledge and belief, in the science 
education literature. But even here the number of contributions remains insignificant. See for example, 
Sherry Southerland, Gale Sinatra, and Michael Matthews, “Belief, Knowledge, and Science Education,” 
Educational Psychology Review 13, no.4 (2001): 325-251; Mike Smith and Harvey Siegel, “Knowing, 
Believing, and Understanding: What Goals for Science Education?” Science & Education 13, no.6 (2004): 
553-582; and Peter Davson-Galle, “Understanding: Knowledge, Belief, and Understanding,” Science & 
Education 13, no.6 (2004): 591-598. 
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possibility of understanding,”90 questions the limitations of certain narrative definitions 
of understanding commonly subscribed to in the field of education. Here, I wish to 
similarly argue that the predominant view afforded to understanding in the NOS literature 
has roots in the Aristotelian notion of techné rather than phronesis, Descartes’ 
foundationalism, and the resulting primacy of method purported by philosophers well 
into the 20th century.  
In his Nicomachean Ethics,91 Aristotle posits an account of knowledge consisting 
of various disparate although possibly interrelated types of knowing. Among these, two 
forms of reasoning differ in their respective modes of activity, that of production and that 
of conduct: 
Aristotle there aligns techné with a kind of activity which he calls “making” or 
“production” (poieses). This activity issues in a durable outcome, a product or 
state of affairs which can be precisely specified by the maker before he engages in 
his activity and which, as surviving the latter, provides it with its end or purpose 
(telos). Techné then is a kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker; it gives 
him a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the how and with-what of the 
making process and enables him, through the capacity to offer a rational account 
of it, to provide over his activity with secure mastery…he recognized another type 
of activity, praxis, which is conduct in a public space with others in which a 
person, without ulterior purpose and with a view to no object detachable from 
himself, acts in such a way as to realize excellences that he has come to appreciate 
in his community as constitutive of a worthwhile way of life. As an activity that 
both involved one with other people and at the same time, was a realization of 
one's self, praxis engaged one more intimately, or afforded one less detachment, 
than the poiesis over which one exercised an uncompromised sovereignty. 92 
 
The latter form of reasoning he referred to as phronesis and, by it, formulated a means 
“… of viewing the regulation of practice as something nontechnical but not, however, 
                                                 
90 HE, 4. 
91 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd edition, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1999). 
92 RG, 9.  
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nonrational.”93 Delineating between the agent, in the case of phronesis, and the producer, 
in the case of poieses, a further distinction has been drawn between the inability of the 
former to “…stand outside his materials and allow the productive process to be shaped by 
the impersonal form which he has objectively conceived” as “…he becomes and 
discovers who he is through [his] actions.”94 As such, phronesis does not stand outside or 
above oneself and is unable to be instrumentalized in the same way that techné can be 
manipulated by a sovereign maker.95 Although scholars contend that Aristotle himself 
recognized the supremacy of theoretical knowledge, or techné, over phronesis and 
considered a life of contemplation as self-satisfying, he simultaneously acknowledged its 
limitations with regard to sustaining life, thereby conferring upon phronesis a notable 
distinction.96  
In addition to developing his philosophical hermeneutics against a reducibly 
technical form of knowledge, Gadamer questioned the primacy of method afforded to 
hermeneutical inquiry, as influenced by Cartesian foundationalism. In his Discourse on 
the Method, Descartes suggests that “…whether awake or asleep, we ought never to be 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 10.  
94 Ibid., 263.  
95 Gallagher posits a further analogy between techné and phronesis derived from French philosopher, 
Gabriel Marcel’s, problem and mystery, and similar to one suggested by Gadamer in his hermeneutics. As 
the editor of his Creative Fidelity explains: “…At the heart of Marcel’s rejection of totalizing, 
representational, objectifying models of knowing (to use contemporary jargon) is the distinction between a 
problem and a mystery. There are problems, to be sure, when our cognitive challenge comes from not 
having enough of the world before us; but from the experience of ordinary sensibles to the experience of 
the absolute Thou, what we usually confront are mysteries in which experience gives us more than we can 
grasp or say. Mystery is not to be construed ‘as a lacuna in our knowledge, as a void to be filled, but rather 
as a certain plenitude (p. 152). For this reason, the real ‘is always more than anything I can say about it’ (p. 
224).” See Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal (New York, NY: Fordham University 
Press, 2002), 152 and 154. 
96 It is worthwhile mentioning here that questions have been raised concerning the nature of the 
significance afforded to such a distinction between techné and phronesis in Aristotle’s own thought. See for 
example, RG, 246-247.  
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persuaded of the truth of anything unless on the evidence of our own reason.”97  In his 
endeavor to discover the foundations necessary for his rationalism, he resolved to 
eradicate his previous opinions, which he believed depended more on custom and 
example than knowledge, that he “…might afterwards be in a position to admit either 
others more correct, or even perhaps the same when they had undergone the scrutiny of 
reason.”98 Descartes’ four-step method, resulting in his cogito ergo sum, was predicated 
on an explicit attempt to avoid all sources of prejudice in an effort to acquire clearer and 
more distinct conceptions of the objects of his reason. Such a conceptualization of 
knowledge, and arguably understanding, inaugurated a significant reliance on the proper 
use of method and the subjugation of the ontological nature of both knowing and 
understanding. For example, echoing the sentiment of Descartes, Bertrand Russell sought 
“…to look into all [his] beliefs, and discard them if they seemed to have no foundation 
except tradition or [his] own prejudices.” For Russell, the methods of science should be 
privileged because of their ability to distinguish between true knowledge and mere 
opinion: 
It is science that makes the difference between the modern world and the world 
before the 17th century. It is science that has destroyed the belief in witchcraft, 
magic, and sorcery. It is science that has made the old creeds and the old 
superstitions impossible for intelligent men to accept. It is science that has taught 
us the way to substitute tentative truth for cocksure error. The scientific spirit, the 
scientific method, the framework of the scientific world, must be absorbed by 
anyone who wishes to have a philosophic outlook belonging to our time, not a 
literary antiquarian philosophy fetched out of old books.99 
                                                 
97 Descartes, 12.  
98 Ibid., 4. 
99 Bertrand Russell, The Art of Philosophizing (New York: Philosophical Library, 1968), 9-10. Champions 
of this same scientific spirit are currently engaged in the discourse surrounding the teaching of evolution 
and creation science in the classroom. These philosophers, sociologists, and science educators favor a view 
of naturalism that either affords primacy to the methodological over the metaphysical or insist that the two 
remain disparate. For examples of the former see, Barbara Forrest, “Methodological Naturalism and 
Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection,” Philo 3 (2000): 7-29; and Michael Shermer, Why 
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Although distinguishable from foundationalists by their respective metaphysical 
assumptions, Gallagher suggests that champions of progressive education have likewise 
perpetuated the Cartesian emphasis on method over a consideration of a descriptive 
account of either knowledge or understanding.100 Insofar as such a view of understanding 
as a form of cognition that is in turn only conceptualized in terms of epistemology 
(method) presents an aporia in bringing to light the potential limits imposed by such a 
perspective, I hope to enlarge the discourse on student understanding of NOS through a 
consideration of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.  
Approach to the Study 
The substantive body of literature pertaining to NOS understandings generally 
addresses how such understandings relate to particular tenets posited to be representative 
of a consensus and/or desired view of NOS. Within this line of inquiry, philosophical 
discourse has been considerably limited to topics concerning the ontological assumptions 
inherent in the NOS tenets. The present study instead addresses the metaphysical and 
epistemological underpinnings of the notion of understanding commonly used in the 
discourse on NOS teaching and learning. Ultimately, I suggest the use of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics as a referent for considering student understandings of NOS concepts with 
the aim of enlarging rather than foreclosing those same understandings. 
                                                                                                                                                 
People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstitions, and Other Confusions of Our Time (New 
York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2000). For an example of the latter see, Stephen J. Gould, 
“Nonoverlapping Magisteria,” Natural History (1997): 1-9; and Eugenie C. Scott, Evolution vs. 
Creationism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).    
100 For example, John Dewey aims to “…carry over into any inquiry into human and moral subjects the 
kind of method (the method of observation, theory as hypothesis, and experimental test) by which 
understanding of physical nature has been brought to its present pitch.” See John Dewey, Reconstruction in 
Philosophy (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960), ix.  
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Whereas earlier hermeneuts delineated between three major types of subilitas,101 
Gadamer considered understanding to involve interpretation and inherently imply 
application. Thus, the notion of student understanding achieves a hermeneutical 
significance insofar as NOS pedagogy involves multiple instances of interpretation such 
as those between teacher and student, student and NOS content, and teacher and NOS 
content.102 Because the study of interpretation and understanding (hermeneutics) is 
inherently a philosophical endeavor, it is appropriate to engage in a philosophical 
analysis of the meaning students make when considering the scientific worldview, 
science inquiry, and the scientific enterprise.103 Such an analysis provides a cogent 
argument for the need to reconceptualize the predominant view relating to student 
understanding of NOS in terms of a Gadamerian view of understanding which includes, 
but is not limited to, the notions of fore-structure, prejudice, temporal distance, and 
history of effect. It is important to note again at this point that, although the intent of the 
present study is described as such, the result of such an inquiry may yield an analysis not 
entirely articulated at the study’s inception, as suggested by Dunne: 
For it was with a firm footing in the world of practical affairs (that of teaching and 
schools) that we first identified our problem and then went to the philosophers 
seeking a quite specific type of enlightenment. What we discover, however, is that 
philosophy will serve us only if we surrender to it. The original problem does not 
remain in a position to dictate what the terms of the conversation will be but is 
itself assumed into and transformed by it. It is as if one were to take up a game 
with the object of becoming fit and then to find that one has succumbed to the 
charm of the game itself so that one continues in a new and developing 
                                                 
101 As explained by Gadamer, subilitas intelligendi refers to understanding, subilitas explicandi to 
interpretation, and subilitas applicandi to application. See TM, 308. 
102 For a more detailed explanation of the various interchanges that occur in the educational context, see 
HE, Chapter 2.  
103 Here, philosophical analysis consists primarily of questioning the justification of a particular aspect of 
science education (i.e. views of student understanding of NOS) and basing recommendations on appeals to 
background knowledge (i.e. H.G. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics).  
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relationship to it – with one’s original purpose not unfulfilled but transmuted in a 
way not anticipated.104 
 
Insofar as this study consists of a conceptual analysis of understanding, the remainder of 
this chapter contains a brief introduction to these salient elements of Gadamer’s 
philosophy that are used in subsequent chapters to support a reconceptualization of the 
narrative definition commonly afforded to understanding in educational practice.  
Fore-structure, Prejudice, Temporal Distance, and History of Effect 
According to Gadamer, Heidegger’s Being and Time provides the hermeneut with 
a circle of understanding that is comprised of working out a series of fore-structures 
(fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception) in an attempt to project a meaning for a 
given text.105 Furthermore, understanding is possible only when these fore-structures are 
not arbitrary but rather considered in light of the things themselves. Gadamer is explicit 
in suggesting that what is constitutive to the art of understanding involves not a 
subjugation of these particular fore-structures but rather a hermeneutic consciousness that 
remains open to the meaning of the other: 
Of course this does not mean that when we listen to someone or read a book we 
must forget all our fore-meanings concerning the content and all our own ideas. 
All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text. 
But this openness always includes our situating the other meaning in relation to 
the whole of our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it…this kind of 
sensitivity involves neither neutrality with respect to content nor the extinction of 
one’s self, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings 
and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the 
text can present itself in all its otherness and assert its own truth against one’s 
own fore-meanings.106 
 
                                                 
104 RG, 22. 
105 TM, 267. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Circle of Understanding,” in Connolly and Keutner, 
eds., Hermeneutics vs. Science (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 68-78. 
106 TM, 268-269. 
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Thus the concept of fore-structure serves as one point of departure between philosophical 
and earlier hermeneutic reform which remained entangled in the fundamental prejudice 
of the Enlightenment: the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its 
power.   
Gadamer addresses the prejudice-structure emanating from the 18th century at 
considerable length by referring back to the Kantian notion of understanding tradition 
correctly, rationally and without prejudice, and the Enlightenment ideal of accepting no 
authority and deciding everything before the judgment seat of reason.107 Considering the 
primacy of an individual’s tradition even over his judgments, he posits, instead, the need 
to restore the concept of legitimate prejudices, as distinct from those resulting from errors 
in the use of one’s own reason, or overhastiness, and reject the mutually exclusive 
Cartesian division between reason and authority. 
If the prestige of authority displaces one’s own judgment then authority is in fact 
a source of prejudices. But this does not preclude its being a source of truth, and 
that is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all authority. In 
fact, the denigration of authority is not the only prejudice established by the 
Enlightenment. It also distorted the very concept of authority. Based on the 
Enlightenment conception of reason and freedom, the concept of authority could 
be viewed as diametrically opposed to reason and freedom: to be in fact blind 
obedience.108 
 
Philosophical hermeneutics accepts the claims of authority as neither illogical nor 
capricious and also accepts the subsequent idea that the mature person is one whose 
insights and decisions are not freed from all tradition. As such, one of the primary tasks 
                                                 
107 Ibid., 272-273. I posit that the rejection of any legitimate authority in the event of understanding is 
evidenced in the writings of prominent philosophers from the 17th through the 20th century. See for example 
Descartes, Discourse and Russell, The Art of Philosophizing. 
108 Ibid., 279. 
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of hermeneutics is to explicate the separation of the productive fore-structures from those 
that hinder understanding that takes place in the process of understanding itself.109 
This second point of departure between Gadamer’s hermeneutics and that 
purported by both the romantics (Schleiermacher) and the historical school (Dilthey) is 
further evidenced by the distinction between their respective views on the circular 
structure of understanding or the hermeneutic circle. For Schleiermacher and other 18th 
century philosophers, actual understanding is achieved when the parts that are determined 
by the whole themselves also determine the whole, as exemplified by the Biblical 
exegetics who interpret Sacred Scripture by moving between the text in its entirety and 
the individual books that constitute it. Consequently, “the circular movement of 
understanding runs backwards and forwards along the text and ceases when the text is 
perfectly understood,”110 and understanding has failed when this perfect harmony is not 
attained. Beginning with Heidegger and later for Gadamer, the circle is more fully 
realized rather than dissolved in perfect understanding and becomes recognized as an 
interplay that occurs in the temporal distance between the interpreter and the tradition. 
This interplay, in turn, allows for the development of understanding in that it is 
predicated on the interchange between the familiar and the strange, a constitutive element 
in the task of hermeneutics.  
Hermeneutics must start from the position that a person seeking to understand 
something has a bond to the subject matter, has come into language through the 
traditionary text and has or acquires a connection with the tradition from which 
the text speaks. Hermeneutic work is based on a polarity of familiarity and 
strangeness; but this polarity is not to be regarded psychologically, as the range 
that covers the mystery of individuality, but truly hermeneutically- i.e., in regard 
to what has been said: the language in which the text addresses us, the story that it 
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tells us. Here too there is a tension. It is in the play between the traditionary text’s 
strangeness and familiarity to us, between being a historically intended, 
distanciated object and belonging to a tradition. The true locus of hermeneutics is 
this in-between.111  
 
Furthermore, rejecting the idea that the meaning of a text resides in the contingencies of 
the author and original audience, philosophical hermeneutics claims that understanding is 
a productive act that does not amount to a better understanding, “either in the case of 
superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or in the sense of fundamental 
superiority of conscious over unconscious production.”112 To this end, the idea of 
temporal distance assists in distinguishing between true and false prejudices as they are 
stirred up and put to risk by being confronted with another text. 
This tension between familiarity and strangeness is further described in terms of 
Gadamer’s principle of history of effect, an element in the act of understanding 
characterizing the nature of the horizons of both the knower and the known. Here the 
notion of horizon replaces the more limited concept of situation so as to emphasize the 
need to see beyond what is nearby in an effort to position oneself in the situation of the 
other. Additionally, the hermeneutic situation depends on obtaining the necessary 
“…horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition.”113 In 
explaining the history of effect as it relates to a fusion of horizons, Gadamer further 
distinguishes his notion of understanding predicated on a dialogical interchange between 
the past and the present: 
Understanding tradition undoubtedly requires a historical horizon then. For what 
do we mean by transposing ourselves? Certainly not just disregarding ourselves. 
This is necessary of course insofar as we must imagine the other situation. But 
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into this other situation we must bring, precisely, ourselves. Transposing 
ourselves consists neither in the empathy of one individual for another nor in 
subordinating another person to our own standards; rather it always involves 
rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but 
also that of the other. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond 
what is close at hand- not in order to look away from it, but to see it better, within 
a larger whole and in truer proportion. The horizon of the present cannot be 
formed without the past. Rather understanding is always the fusion of these 
horizons supposedly existing by themselves. The hermeneutic task consists in not 
covering up this tension (between horizons) by attempting a naïve assimilation of 
the two but in consciously bringing it out.114 
 
Establishing the principles of historical effect, temporal distance, prejudice, and fore-
structures then is integral to the development of a hermeneutic consciousness insofar as 
one seeks to make the meaning of what has been handed down through tradition 
intelligible without having to reach an agreement with his own historicity. Additionally, 
these same principles allow Gadamer to expound on a series of topics, namely the 
priority of the question, the meaning of experience, and the idea of application, that have 
been taken up by educational philosophers in the past and are similarly used in the 
forthcoming chapters of this analysis to reconsider student understanding of NOS. 
The Problem of Application, Experience, and the Priority of the Question 
As mentioned previously, Gadamer dissolves the traditionally disparate subilitas 
in positing a unified hermeneutics that is comprised of understanding, interpretation, and 
application. Concerning the latter, he writes “...that application is neither a subsequent 
nor merely an occasional part of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the 
beginning.”115 The art of interpretation implies application in the fusion of horizons that 
is constitutive of understanding. Such a notion, according to Gadamer, contrasts with the 
demands of science which purports that understanding is achievable only when the 
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interpreter refrains from participating in such an interchange.116 The crux of his argument 
regarding application centers on Aristotelian ethics that connects “…reason with 
knowledge, not detached from a being that is becoming, but determined by it and 
determinative of it.”117 This form of knowledge instead pertains to the conduct of one’s 
life and has been characterized as a form of “…activity which may leave no separately 
identifiable outcome behind it and whose end, therefore, is realized in the very doing of 
the activity itself.”118 
Unlike both theoretical (epistemé) and technical (techné) knowledge, this moral 
form of reasoning, phronesis, is not objective knowledge but is rather something that the 
interpreter has to do. It is not a “…cognitive capacity that one has at one's disposal but is, 
rather, very closely bound up with the kind of person that one is...phronesis falls on the 
side of virtue rather than of knowledge.”119 Understanding hence, when considered in 
terms of phronesis, becomes more of an event than a method which the interpreter 
purposefully applies in objectifying a text, thereby precluding any distinction between the 
subjectivity of the individual and the objectivity of the text. While Gadamer, following 
Aristotle, relates techné and phronesis in that they both serve to determine and guide 
action, he emphasizes a primary distinction drawn by the Greek philosopher between the 
two by referring to the former as a knowledge of how to make for oneself and the latter as 
self knowledge. 
It is not only that moral knowledge has no merely particular end but pertains to 
right living in general, whereas all technical knowledge is particular and serves 
particular ends. Certainly if technical knowledge were available, it would always 
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make it unnecessary to deliberate with oneself about the subject. Where there is a 
techné, we must learn it and then we are able to find the right means. We see that 
moral knowledge, however, always requires this kind of self deliberation.120  
 
Gadamer is explicit in asserting that since moral knowledge is unknowable in advance 
but rather realized in the situation of the person acting, his principles on phronesis are 
incapable of being taught, although they “…really do correspond to the nature of the 
thing.”121  
Furthering the distinction between phronesis and techné, Gadamer next addresses 
the concept of experience (Erfahrung) for the philosophical hermeneut. He contends that 
self knowledge cannot be separated from experience as in the case of knowing how to do 
for oneself. The latter form of reasoning is predicated on a teleological view of 
experience that concerns itself with the knowledge to be gained through a confirmable 
event.122 Gadamer expounds on this particular perspective through his analysis of a 
Baconian method of induction which “…seeks to rise above the accidental and irregular 
way that daily experience occurs and certainly above its dialectical use.”123 Such a 
method, which stands in opposition to what Bacon considered as interpretation naturae, 
or the interpretation that exists through the true being of nature, experimentally seeks to 
thwart the mind from entertaining impetuous generalizations. Because of the ontological 
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nature of our prejudice-structure and fore-understandings, philosophical hermeneutics 
instead posits a dialectical view of experience, similar to although not synonymous with 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, which precludes experiencing an object at random and 
allows for enlarging what we thought we knew before. While a Hegelian notion of 
experience ends in absolute knowledge, when all experience has been overcome, 
Gadamer favors a dialectic of experience that “…has its proper fulfillment not in 
definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by 
experience itself.”124 In describing the dispositions characteristic of the experienced 
person, Gadamer writes: 
The consummation of his experience, the perfection that we call “being 
experienced,” does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything 
and knows better than anyone else. Rather, the experienced person proves to be, 
on the contrary, someone who, because of the many experiences he has had and 
the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new 
experiences and to learn from them.125 
 
Such a view of experience resonates with Dunne’s account of the value of experience as 
constitutive of phronesis: 
…experience signifies an achieved state that is the fruit of universalizing and 
consolidating the meaning of many previous discrete impressions; this primary 
significance is most perspicuously present in our own use of the phrase an 
experienced person… phronesis is what enables experience to be self-correcting 
and to avoid settling into mere routine.126 
 
Insofar then as experience implies new experience, to be situated within a tradition, as in 
the case of historically effected consciousness, it establishes rather than limits the 
freedom of knowledge.  
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Such a view of experience is made possible only by the asking of questions. For 
Gadamer, the priority of the question is exemplified in the Platonic account of 
knowledge, where in order to be able to ask questions, one must want to know and that 
means knowing that one does not know. This openness to asking, like the aforementioned 
openness to new experiences, is thus bounded by the respective horizons of the 
interpreter and the universal and results in a type of dialectical negativity, a knowledge of 
not knowing. Because it is considered more of a disposition than an action to be able to 
determine what is questionable, Gadamer contends that the idea of method thus remains 
limited for understanding.127 Similarly, he is careful to distinguish such a form of 
knowledge from other variations of rhetoric which may attempt to use questioning as a 
means of persuasion: 
It requires that one does not try to argue the other person down but that one really 
considers the weight of the other’s opinion. Hence it is an art of testing. A person 
skilled in the art of questioning is a person who can prevent questions from being 
suppressed by the dominant opinion. Dialectic consists not in trying to discover 
the weakness of what is said, but in bringing out its real strength. It is not the art 
of arguing (which can make a strong case out of a weak one), but the art of 
thinking (which can strengthen objections by referring to the subject matter).128 
 
The perspectives assumed in interpreting the notions of questioning, experiencing, and 
application arguably contribute to defining understanding in education. I suggest in 
Chapter Four that the philosophical underpinnings inherent in current NOS teaching and 
learning, which seem to favor an epistemological as opposed to hermeneutical view of 
understanding, may indeed limit rather than enlarge student understanding.  
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Summary and Study Outline 
The present study is educationally relevant in that it addresses the import of 
incorporating philosophical hermeneutics into the discourse surrounding student 
understanding of nature-of-science considerations. The next chapter contains a 
description of both the rationale supporting the inclusion of NOS considerations in 
national reform efforts as well as the body of empirical research that has resulted from 
such an inclusion. In the chapters that follow, I use the Gadamerian elements as explained 
here to analyze perspectives on student understanding as evidenced in the national reform 
documents of the last two decades and the science education literature from the same 
period, cognizant of my aim to avoid a uniquely technical analysis and willing to remain 
open to the multiple experiences that such an endeavor can afford: 
Philosophy is itself a practice, and, as in the case of any other practice, it is only 
when one gets caught up in the doing it that one can learn to get out of it what it 
has to give. What it has to give is indeed a kind of insight into the structure of our 
other practical engagements and, moreover, far from it being the case that 
experience in any of these (e.g., teaching) must be left behind when one takes it 
up, such experience is itself a prerequisite for fruitful participation in it.129 
 
In the final chapter, I discuss the positive value of considering Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
as a referent for both student understanding of NOS and the scholarly discourse 
surrounding that understanding.
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CHAPTER THREE 
NATURE-OF-SCIENCE 
 
A Rationale 
Whereas a thorough analysis of the various rationales supporting the inclusion of 
NOS considerations in the secondary science curriculum is largely beyond the scope of 
this paper, a brief mention of the respective arguments of NOS advocates, both in the 
science education and curriculum reform policy communities, provides a context for 
situating the present discourse pertaining to student understanding of such 
considerations.130 Nearly two decades ago, at the inception of what was to be a 
recognizable period of science education reform, policy makers touted the ability of 
science to “…help students to develop the understandings and habits of mind they need to 
become compassionate human beings able to think for themselves and to face life head 
on.”131 Ten years later, McComas, Almazroa, and Clough provided science education 
researchers with a concise overview of the case for NOS, referencing a four-pronged 
argument for NOS pedagogy that included utilitarian, democratic, cultural, and moral 
components.132 According to the argument, students who understand NOS are better able 
to make sense of science and technology, participate in socio-scientific decision-making, 
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value science as central to the development of our culture, and understand the moral 
commitments of scientists, commitments which can be instrumentalized by the larger 
society.133 Another ten years later, similar sentiments were evident in the editor’s 
introduction of an important text on scientific inquiry and NOS: 
Such understandings are critical, especially when we quickly come to realize that 
it is unreasonable to assume that our citizenry will make decisions about 
scientifically and technologically-based issues by running to the garage to conduct 
authentic scientific investigations. More realistically, experiences with inquiry 
provide our students with foundational experiences from which they can reflect 
on the nature and limits of scientific knowledge and claims. It is based upon this 
knowledge that the general citizenry will derive meaning and research 
conclusions concerning knowledge claims. This is the value of nature of 
science.134 
 
Resounding similarly with such democratic ideals as effective and responsible citizenship 
and personal and social decision-making, the last reference additionally includes an 
understanding of the limits of scientific knowledge claims as a favorable outcome of 
NOS instruction. Proponents of such a view argue that “…individuals who understand 
how science works will likely be less cynical about the scientific enterprise.”135 At the 
same time, a number of researchers posit that acknowledging such limitations enables 
learners to delineate between science and other epistemologies, thereby easing the 
possible tension caused by discussions pertaining to scientific concepts that may conflict 
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with certain metaphysical, theological, or other worldview assumptions.136 While these 
same researchers may not explicitly purport a privileged status for scientific knowledge, 
one final group of NOS advocates maintains that, as the only truly verifiable and self-
correcting mode of inquiry, the domain of science should be recognized for its 
remarkable effectiveness: “…unarguable and spectacular is the ace up science’s sleeve. 
Whatever else we may think of it, we have to accept that science works. Penicillin cures 
diseases, aircraft fly crops grow more intensely because of fertilizers, and so on.”137 Such 
a view of science leads others in the science education community to the following 
interpretation of the work of evolutionary biologist, Edward O. Wilson: 
…evolutionary biologist Edward Wilson argues that only when all knowledge is 
grounded on the firm foundation of the natural sciences will we have the best 
chance of coping successfully with our existence. Taken to its logical conclusion, 
this view of science can become the basis of a new conception of what it means to 
'”know.” The many nuances and complexities become apparent as one studies the 
history of science, but the essentially rational, progressive, universal nature of 
science is the more accurate picture that science teachers should help students 
understand. At the close of this century, Edward Wilson is saying that science will 
show all disciplines, not just philosophy, the way toward more valid and reliable 
knowledge. Science teachers should pay better attention to Wilson's ideas as they 
search for ways to help students better understand the nature of science.138 
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Whether by acknowledging the epistemological authority of science, seeking to 
ameliorate the possible epistemic tensions encountered by learners and instilling in 
students a greater appreciation for the discipline, or attempting to promote a greater sense 
of responsibility and develop enhanced decision-making skills, advocates for the 
inclusion of NOS in secondary science pedagogy have noticeably engaged science 
educators and policy makers for the last two decades as evidenced by the considerable 
amount of research in the area. The next section of this chapter provides an overview of 
such research which subsequently serves as the focus of philosophical inquiry. 
Research and Reform 
Resulting from any combination of the various rationales supporting the inclusion 
of NOS instruction in the school science classroom, reform efforts for the last twenty 
years have focused largely on teaching a science that both promotes contemporary views 
of NOS and seeks to develop those same views in secondary students.139 As such, the 
National Science Education Standards state that “…students should develop an 
understanding of what science is, what science is not, what science can and cannot do, 
and how science contributes to culture.”140 Additionally, a consensus of researchers has 
                                                                                                                                                 
accounts. See Forrest, “Methodological Naturalism” for a similar opinion in favor of science as a privileged 
way of knowing when compared to other worldviews that deny ontological naturalism.  
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maintained that “…it is critical for us to do more than avoid debates about nature-of-
science by rising to a level of generality where disagreements do not exist. As educators, 
it is absolutely critical that we carefully consider what aspects of nature-of-science are 
accessible to school-aged students and what aspects make sense for all students to 
know.”141 It is precisely this call for considering a set of NOS aspects that are both 
appropriate and accessible for students that has dominated a substantial portion of the 
research endeavor. What follows is a sampling of the numerous attempts found in the 
literature either to posit a desirable set of such NOS aspects for science students or to 
promote the use of NOS tenets to evaluate NOS understandings. 
Beginning with the reform documents of the 1990s, The Benchmarks for 
Scientific Literacy and National Science Education Standards address a number of 
characteristics that pertain to NOS, examples of which include science as a way of 
knowing, involving curiosity, creativity, and chance, dependent on persuasive 
communication of ideas and findings, and built on a set of functional assumptions, some 
of which involve the behavior of the universe and the understandability and predictability 
of nature. 142 Extracting from some eight international science standards documents, 
researchers have added that science is durable yet tentative, comprised of theory-laden 
observations and both an evolutionary and revolutionary character, and affected by 
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social, historical, and cultural traditions.143 Others have created models of nature-of-
science to include premises of both the nature of the scientific enterprise, such as the 
social dimension of science and the major phases of the scientific endeavor, as well as the 
nature of scientific knowledge, such as the developmental character of scientific 
knowledge, to allow for appropriate curriculum development efforts and empirical 
research.144  
Science educators have further appropriated these tenets to derive criteria they 
deem useful in assessing NOS understandings. In one such study of secondary science 
teachers, the ideas of tentativeness, empirical basis, subjectivity, creativity, sociocultural 
embeddedness, observation and inference, and laws and theories were used to compare 
NOS conceptions before and after a science research internship treatment course.145 In 
another study of school age students, nine themes, including scientific methods, diversity 
of thinking, hypothesis and prediction, historical development of scientific knowledge, 
and cooperation and collaboration in the development of scientific knowledge, were 
considered in the development of a simplified account of NOS.146 Lastly, in a study 
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involving science textbooks, researchers used a similar set of tenets to examine the 
inclusion and representation of NOS aspects.147 
In addition to efforts aimed at establishing generally acceptable and appropriate 
NOS considerations for science education, researchers have focused their attention on 
various pedagogical approaches which support the teaching of these considerations. 
Recognizing the need to understand initial student understanding in order to successfully 
teach about NOS, there is an ample body of literature pertaining to preconceptions, a 
variable addressed in conceptual change learning theory.148 Based on the premise that 
“…a conceptual change framework helps makes sense of the difficulties students often 
have developing robust understandings of the NOS that can be applied in a variety of 
settings,”149 one study, for example, sought to identify the “…strategies used by 
secondary science teachers to diagnose their students' preconceptions in the regular 
classroom environment and the ways that teachers might use the information gathered in 
such a diagnosis.”150 Another study involving students in grades six, eight, and ten, 
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149 Michael P. Clough, “Learners’ Responses to the Demands of Conceptual Change,” Science and 
Education 15, no.5 (2006): 489. 
150 Judith Morrison and Norman Lederman, “Science Teachers’ Diagnosis and Understanding of Students’ 
Preconceptions,” Science Education 87, no.6 (2003): 850.  
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contained research questions predicated on the idea that students’ existing conceptions 
are very resistant to change and tend to impact the learning of new concepts.151  
Several researchers have, however, questioned the assumptions underlying the 
inherently rational account afforded to knowledge acquisition by such a theory. Notable 
among these is a challenge to the conceptual change model in that it acknowledges 
epistemological and metaphysical commitments among students as integral to the 
development of new knowledge only to later “…marginalize [such commitments] in 
favor of using anomalous data to induce conceptual shifts in students.”152  Additionally, 
scholars examining the differences in learning between students of varying cultural 
worldviews, suggest that those of non-Western origin have greater barriers to learning 
science that are not strictly based on language.153 Rather than seek to promote cognitive 
transformations as suggested by change theorists, these science educators suggest that:  
The objective of initiating discussions upon the nature of science and culture 
should not be towards discovering constructions that are then labeled as 
“misconceptions.” The purpose of encouraging students to disclose their ideas 
about science and traditional knowledge is to facilitate an increase in the 
understanding of the differences in the epistemological premises.154 
 
                                                 
151 Sukjin Kang, Lawrence Scharmann, and Taehee Noh, “Examining Students’ Views on the Nature of 
Science: Results from Korean 6th, 8th, and 10th Graders,” Science Education 89, no.2 (2004): 314-334.  
152 John Rudolph and Jim Stewart, “Evolution and the Nature of Science: On the Historical Discord and Its 
Implications for Education,” Journal of Research in Science Teaching 35, no. 10 (1998): 1082. The authors 
contend that such commitments pose a significant barrier to learning and propose their inclusion as part of 
the sense-making process in science. In Cobern’s, “The Nature of Science,” the author maintains that such 
preconceptions are often viewed as beliefs rather than knowledge. In such instances, teaching can remain 
authoritarian if the reasons supporting those beliefs are ignored irrespective of the use of inquiry-oriented 
instruction.  
153 Dawn Sutherland and Reg Dennick, “Exploring Culture, Language, and the Perception of the Nature of 
Science,” International Journal of Science Education 24, no.1 (2002): 1-25. The authors here report on the 
assimilative nature of the science curriculum in that it privileges Western science over other ways of 
knowing. They further contrast such an epistemology with the coming-to-knowing process valued by 
certain cultures. See 3-5.   
154 Ibid., 21. 
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While acrimony indeed surrounds the viability of a conceptual change theory of 
learning for all science students, its adherents, who undoubtedly comprise the majority of 
science education researchers, continue to believe that students interpret experiences 
from a framework consisting of prior knowledge and additional experiences, thereby 
positing that certain naïve views of NOS can be attributed partially to a lack of sufficient 
experiences with the sciences. It follows then that a subsequent focus of NOS research 
centers on both developing and evaluating those types of educational experiences 
necessary to promote students’ understandings of NOS.  
One of the more prominent discussions that have taken place in the literature 
concerning how to effectively promote NOS understandings revolves around the 
distinction between implicit and explicit attempts at instruction.155 The former generally 
involve the inclusion of particular experiences in classroom instruction in an effort to 
engage learners in scientific inquiry with the hope that, in doing so, they will develop 
NOS conceptions aligned with current perspectives.156 Critics of such pedagogical 
practices, however, caution against the likelihood of adequately advancing NOS 
understandings without the direct involvement of the teacher and the deliberate design of 
lessons to address particular NOS issues: 
                                                 
155 Although the focus of the present concern is on teaching for enhanced student understanding of NOS, 
researchers have similarly explored the methods used to promote teacher understandings of the same 
concepts. See Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman, “Improving Science Teachers’ Conceptions,” 691 for a 
summary of the research involving both implicit and explicit approaches to teaching teachers.   
156 In order to appropriately allow for students to engage in authentic inquiry, several researchers recognize 
the necessary transformation needed to take place in the context of classroom teaching. As one set of 
authors posit, “… for many teachers, encultured in the habitus of traditional science teaching, this would 
require a shift in their conception of their own role from dispenser of knowledge to facilitator of learning; a 
change in their classroom discourse to one which is more open and dialogic; a shift in their conception of 
the learning goals of science lessons to one which incorporates the development of reasoning and an 
understanding of the epistemic basis of belief in science as well as the acquisition of knowledge.” 
Bartholomew, Osborne, and Ratcliffe, “Teaching Students ‘Ideas-About-Science,’” 678.  
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If school science content instruction consisted solely of activities and laboratory 
work without a teacher intentionally helping students make sense of those 
experiences, certainly the students' content understanding would compare poorly 
to that of another group of students whose teacher intentionally engaged them in 
wrestling with the same science content using the same activities… Mistaken 
notions of the NOS developed in this way, just like mistaken ideas regarding 
natural phenomena, resist later implicit and even many explicit attempts to modify 
those mistaken views. If a child's upbringing consisted entirely of accurate 
implicit experiences regarding the NOS, they would likely develop a number of 
accurate NOS ideas. 157 
 
Instead they favor an explicit approach to teaching and learning as characterized by 
planning through objectives, instructional attention, and assessments. Additionally, 
“…this approach intentionally draws learners' attention to aspects of NOS through 
discussion, guided reflection, and specific questioning in the context of activities, 
investigations, and historical examples.”158 Rather than consider NOS conceptions as 
dispositions towards science and attainable through effective inquiry experiences, 
proponents of explicit instruction view these same conceptions as cognitive learning 
outcomes.159 Of course, researchers contend that there are, in fact, a variety of 
instructional methods that can be developed to incorporate aspects of both implicit and 
explicit approaches. One such study, for example, examined the use of guided attention to 
and reflection on NOS in the context of authentic scientific research, where the intention 
                                                 
157 Clough, “Learners’ Responses,” 466-467. 
158 Schwartz, Lederman, and Crawford, “Developing Views of Nature of Science,” 614. For another 
example of a study using explicit approaches to teach for NOS understandings, see Rola Khishfe and 
Norman Lederman, “Teaching Nature of Science within a Controversial Topic: Integrated versus 
Nonintegrated,” Journal of research in Science Teaching 43, no.4 (2006): 395-418.  
159 See for example, Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman, “Improving Science Teachers’ Conceptions,” 691 and 
Lederman, “Syntax of Nature of Science.” This last author writes, “Nature of science, and scientific 
inquiry, should be thought of as a "cognitive" rather than an "affective" instructional outcome... then, as 
any cognitive objective, this outcome should be planned for, explicitly taught, and systematically assessed,” 
312. Reducing understanding to a cognitive outcome, as compared to a hermeneutic understanding, will be 
the focus of future analysis in this dissertation.    
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was not so much for the students to act as scientists but rather to become reflective about 
science within the context of the scientific community.160   
It is worthwhile to mention here that, while seemingly favored by advocates of 
science education reform and leaders in the science education community, explicit 
approaches to teaching for NOS understandings have elicited a number of challenges, 
several of which serve as the basis for philosophical analysis in the chapters to follow. 
Primary among these is a concern that a deliberate attempt to promote desired 
understandings could amount to a form of direct teaching and transmission of 
information. In response to such a critique, researchers have maintained a clear 
distinction between explicit attention and didactic teaching, where the former simply 
includes NOS among the various other learning outcomes that serve as the focus of 
instruction, and have posited that explicit approaches to NOS provide students with an 
opportunity to further engage with their learning: 
It might be argued that an explicit approach entails imposing on students certain 
views of the scientific enterprise. However our counter argument would be that 
certain views of NOS have already been imposed on students. It is more likely 
that those students were explicitly taught certain naive ideas about NOS. As such, 
guiding students to internalize more informed views of NOS should not be viewed 
as an episode of formal indoctrination. Rather it should be viewed as an attempt to 
empower them to further pursue and make sense of the workings of a rich and 
interesting intellectual endeavor, the scientific enterprise.161 
 
Several authors are cognizant of and caution against the tendency of such a position to 
assess student understanding based on its alignment with a prescribed set of views on the 
subject and instead reiterate an instructional commitment to student understanding absent 
                                                 
160 Schwartz, Lederman, and Crawford, “Developing Views of Nature of Science.” 
161 Fouad Abd-El-Khalick and Norman Lederman, “The Influence of History of Science Courses on 
Students’ Views of Nature of Science,” Journal of Research in Science Teaching 37, no. 10 (2000): 1088.  
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of adopting any one desirable view of science or the philosophical position of the 
instructor.162 
For these researchers, it logically follows that in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of any given pedagogical strategy in promoting the advancement of a 
desired view of NOS, based on a consensus, pragmatic account of the nature of scientific 
knowledge and the scientific enterprise, the development and use of appropriate methods 
for assessing NOS understandings is a necessary complement to the existing body of 
empirical studies. The vast majority of assessment instruments used prior to the late 
1990s involved any combination of a set of quantitative item responses such as multiple 
choice, agree/disagree, and Likert-type.163  While the inevitability of having to employ 
such methods in some degree in large scale investigations is difficult to question, 
objections were raised against the interpretations of scores from such tests based both on 
the idea that they may lead to biased value judgments, if one assumes a particular 
philosophical position and subsequently a correct view of science, and inaccurate 
explanations of student views when compared to actual interviews.164 Discrepancies arise 
when it is assumed that the understandings of both respondents and instrument 
developers coincide with regard to particular statements. As a response to these 
criticisms, a group of researchers collaborated on the development of the Views of Nature 
of Science Questionnaire (VNOS). Such an instrument, it is argued, “…was developed 
with an interpretive stance in mind, and aims to elucidate learners’ NOS views and 
                                                 
162 See, for example, Smith and Scharmann, “Defining versus Describing;” and Michael Matthews, “James 
T. Robison’s Account of Philosophy of Science and Science Teaching: Some Lessons for Today from the 
1960s,” Science Education 81 (1997): 295-315. 
163 For a list of studies using such instruments, see Abd-El-Khalick and Lederman, “Improving Science 
Teachers’ Conceptions,” 672; and Norman Lederman, Philip Wade, and Randy Bell, “Assessing the Nature 
of Science: What is the Nature of Our Assessment?” Science and Education 7 (1998): 595-615.  
164 See Lederman, Wade, and Bell, “Assessing the Nature of Science,” 611.  
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generate profiles of the meanings they ascribe to various NOS aspects for the purpose of 
informing the teaching and learning of NOS rather than for labeling learners’ views as 
adequate or inadequate or sum their NOS understandings into numerical scores.”165 For 
the last ten years, additional empirical studies have been designed with the intention of 
eliciting student understandings of NOS concepts through the use of interviews in 
combination with other various qualitative methods such as long term participant 
observation and peer collaboration.166 
The above discussion provides an overview of the more salient lines of research 
pertaining to student understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge and the 
scientific enterprise that serve as the focus for philosophical analysis in the chapters to 
follow; namely, a consideration of viable NOS tenets for pre-college students, learners’ 
preconceptions concerning NOS, the effectiveness of respective implicit and explicit 
approaches to teaching for the promotion of NOS considerations, and the use of varied 
methods for assessing student understandings. Before progressing to that analysis, 
however, brief mention is made here regarding the alleged results of a sampling of 
empirical studies surrounding a number of the aforementioned areas of research. 
Concerning the use of a previously identified, acceptable set of NOS tenets, one study 
presented findings indicating that the pre-college student participants held fully formed 
                                                 
165 Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, and Schwartz, “Views of Nature of Science Questionnaire,” 517. It is 
interesting to note that some of these same researchers just a few years before suggested that “…in terms of 
assessment, it is time we move on to questions of classroom practice and lay to rest the continued 
assessment of teachers’ and students’ assessment.” See Lederman, Wade, and Bell, “Assessing the Nature 
of Science,” 612.  
166 See Moss and Abrams, “Examining Student Conceptions,” and Ping-Kee Tao, “Eliciting and 
Developing Junior Secondary Students’ Understanding of the Nature of Science Through a Peer 
Collaboration Instruction in Science Stories,” International Journal of Science Education 25, no. 2 (2003): 
147-171.  
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NOS conceptions consistent with roughly one-half of the tenets.167 Another study 
reported the inadequate alignment of multiple textbook sections with target NOS aspects, 
highlighting the discrepancies that exist between national and international science 
education reform documents and the representation and treatment of NOS in commercial 
school science publication materials.168 
One study, focusing on the methods used to encourage desirable NOS views in 
the classroom, reported that although teachers admitted the importance of knowing prior 
ideas that students bring with them to the classroom, such an appreciation was neither 
well substantiated nor significant enough to encourage the actual use of diagnostic 
strategies in instruction.169 Another study purported that, regardless of the methods used 
to teach NOS, only a small number of students were found to have developed an 
appropriate understanding of a particular view of scientific knowledge and the scientific 
enterprise.170 Conversely, a different set of results suggested that, when given the 
opportunity to assume a reflective stance outside of the role of an inquirer, teachers are 
                                                 
167 Moss and Abrams, “Examining Student Conceptions.”  The authors of this study report that “… the 
designation fully formed or complete is utilized to imply that student beliefs were for the most part 
consistent with the premises of the model. It does not imply that student conceptions could not evolve 
further beyond the model. In contrast, partially conceived, incomplete, or not fully formed describes 
student understandings that were lacking when compared with the ideas outlined in the model,” 776.  It is 
important to recognize here the meaning ascribed to each of the designations used in the study as such 
designations are analyzed in the chapters to follow.  
168 Abd-El-Khalick, Waters, and Le, “Representation of Nature of Science.” 
169 Morrison and Lederman, “Science Teachers’ Diagnosis” and Kang, Sharmann, and Noh, “Examining 
Students’ Views.”  
170 Kang, Scharmann, and Noh, “Examining Students’ Views.” Various explanations have been offered 
concerning such apparent ineffectiveness ranging from the lack of a concerted professional development, a 
consistent and contemporary philosophy, and intentions within curriculum to an interference with students’ 
everyday epistemologies and developmentally based constraints on reasoning. See for example Lederman, 
“Syntax of Nature of Science,” 302, Renee Schwartz and Barbara Crawford, “Authentic Scientific Inquiry,” 
334-335, and Randy L. Bell, “Perusing Pandora’s Box,” 427-446, all in L.B. Flick and N.G. Lederman, 
eds., Scientific Inquiry and Nature of Science: Implications for Teaching, Learning, and Teacher Education 
(Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2006). 
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effectively able to promote the development of NOS views in an inquiry context,171 
further supporting findings that students are apt to attend to understandings of NOS that 
match their inadequate views, absent the guidance from the classroom instructor.172 The 
inclusion of such an explicit approach to inquiry teaching can be problematic, however, 
in that in certain situations, the teacher remained ultimately in control of the discussion, 
limiting student input to answering only those questions posed by the instructor rather 
than engaging in a dialogic discussion.173 Insofar as these results may signify 
“…significant progress toward understanding the whats, whens, and hows of nature of 
science instruction,”174 scholars in the discipline have commented as recently as last 2008 
“…that improving the teaching, learning, and assessing of NOS is still far from being 
clearly understood and translated into practice.”175 The following chapter considers the 
philosophical assumptions inherent in the teaching for NOS understandings as addressed 
in the aforementioned research endeavors.
                                                 
171 Schwartz, Lederman, and Crawford, “Developing Views of Nature of Science.”  
172 Tao, “Eliciting and Developing Junior Secondary Students’ Understanding.” 
173 Bartholomew, Osborne, and Ratcliffe, “Teaching Students Ideas-About-Science,” 669.  
174 Bell, “Purusing Pandora’s Box,” 442.  
175 Michael P. Clough and Joanne K. Olson, “Teaching and Assessing the Nature of Science: An 
Introduction,” Science and Education 17, no. 2 (2008): 143-145, 145.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CURRENT ASSUMPTIONS 
 
While prominent science education researchers interested in promoting student 
understanding of nature-of-science seem quick to maintain and agree upon the 
irrelevance of philosophical analysis pertaining largely to the metaphysical and 
epistemological views of science intended for school science curricula, a review of the 
literature as presented throughout the preceding chapters of this dissertation suggests an 
even greater eschewing, or rather complete absence, of such an inquiry on the nature of 
understanding itself. Whereas in the case of the former, their position is explicated in 
terms of curricular, psychological, and pragmatic considerations,176 no explanations have 
been offered concerning the latter, suggesting perhaps not a deliberate effort to thwart 
such an attempt but rather a lack of recognition of the significance of striving for 
clarification and clarity. Philosophers of education, however, insist upon the importance 
of examining the assumptions underlying the use of such a widely used and poorly 
conceptualized construct as understanding, not only, of course, within narrow lines of 
inquiry but also in the broader context of education. In this chapter, I inquire into the 
fundamental assumptions that seem to support the present use of the idea of teaching for 
student understanding of NOS considerations, namely a Cartesian foundationalism and 
                                                 
176 See, for example, Lederman, “Syntax of Nature of Science,” 303; and Abd-El-Khalick, “Developing 
Deeper Understandings of Nature of Science.”  
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Aristotelian theoretical knowledge, or techné, with the hope of then proceeding to offer a 
different conceptualization of the same idea along the lines of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics in the chapters to follow. 
Cartesian Influences 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, one of Descartes’ signature contributions to the 
field of philosophy, and arguably a considerable number of disciplines as well, including 
education, was his attempt to discover the foundations necessary for rational knowledge 
by resolving to eradicate his previous opinions. The result of such an attempt was his 
infamous four-step method which, he maintained, avoided all sources of prejudice in an 
effort to acquire clearer and more distinct conceptions of the objects of his reason. When 
viewed from a Cartesian sense of tradition, these sources of prejudice “…would have to 
be something external, objective, and past,” capable of being stepped outside of as in 
“…trying to step outside of our own skins.”177 As such, they acquire only a negative 
value and are relegated into an association with either authority or overhastiness.178 The 
result of this “…dominant ideal of knowledge and the alienated, self-sufficient 
consciousness it involves” supports a hermeneutical perspective “…that regards 
understanding as a repetition of a past intention – as a reproductive procedure rather than 
a genuinely productive one that involves the interpreter’s own hermeneutical 
situation.”179 
                                                 
177 Gallagher, HE, 85 and 87. 
178 Gadamer writes: “The division of prejudices into those of ‘authority’ and those of ‘overhastiness’ is 
obviously based on the fundamental presupposition on the Enlightenment, namely that methodologically 
disciplined use of reason can safeguard us from all error. Overhastiness is the source of errors that arise in 
the use of one’s own reason. Authority, however, is responsible for one’s not using one’s own reason at 
all.” TM, 279.  
179 PH, xvi. 
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Insofar as the literature on student understandings of NOS involves a discussion 
of preconceptions and their development, considers nature-of-science as a cognitive 
outcome, and is derived in large part from a rationale consisting of both emancipatory 
and ameliorating elements, I argue that such a discussion is predicated on a Cartesian 
foundationalism as described above.180 Two of the primary reasons provided in support 
of the inclusion of NOS considerations in reform documents and classroom teaching are 
based on the assumption that a mature understanding of such considerations enables 
learners to be more self-sufficient and responsible while simultaneously reducing any 
possible tensions that may arise from metaphysical, theological, or other worldview 
commitments at odds with a scientific epistemology. Such reasons resonate with 
Descartes’ attempt to develop a subjective account of knowledge which, in eradicating all 
sources of prejudice, sought to rely less on the past and tradition and do away with 
obstacles that may interfere with its proper development. This development, in turn, as 
characterized by Descartes as consisting of a series of procedures that begin with the 
subjugation of tradition and end in a more reliable knowledge, is clearly evident in the 
attempt of NOS researchers to examine student preconceptions so as to promote deeper, 
more mature understandings. Whether seeking to analyze the more discrete 
transformation of inadequate into adequate views or the progressive change in naïve 
towards more intermediary or informed conceptions, the empirical studies mentioned 
                                                 
180 While the NOS research addressed here was thoroughly discussed in the preceding chapter, the 
following additional reference further exemplifies the rationale supporting teaching for NOS 
understandings: “…few individuals even have an elementary understanding how the scientific enterprise 
operates. The lack of understanding is potentially harmful, particularly in societies where citizens have a 
voice in science funding decisions, evaluating policy matters and weighing scientific evidence provided in 
legal proceedings. At the foundation of many illogical decisions and unreasonable positions are 
misunderstandings of the character of science.” McComas, Almazroa, and Clough, “The Nature of 
Science,” 511. 
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here all support a developmental model that serves as the foundation for understanding 
understanding. 
Regardless of the view taken on such a developmental process by NOS 
researchers, all of the currently employed models of understanding are seemingly rooted 
in a conceptual change theory of cognition. As discussed in Chapter Three, such a theory 
considers prior knowledge mostly in terms of the difficulty it presents in developing more 
complete understandings. The attempt of many researchers to “…marginalize [such 
commitments] in favor of using anomalous data to induce conceptual shifts in 
students”181  and consider them as a form of belief rather than knowledge182 is 
remarkably analogous to the Cartesian inclination to denigrate preconceptions as mere 
opinion and unreliable. Similarly, as “…Descartes was most anxious to escape the 
tradition of metaphysical disputations, which seemed to him to provide all of the 
convoluted categories responsible for leading our thought astray,”183 a significant portion 
of NOS research eschews any mention of including such commitments in the discourse 
on student understanding.184 Instead, the focus is predominantly on successfully teaching 
for an adequate understanding of NOS as determined by a set of predetermined, 
appropriate tenets. As a result, the context for teaching and learning assumes a 
reproductive character where the student is often left to arrive at an answer previously 
                                                 
181 Rudolph and Stewart, “Evolution and the Nature of Science,” 1082.  
182 Cobern, “The Nature of Science.” 
183 HE, 84.  
184 See Rudolph and Stewart, “Evolution and the Nature of Science.” 
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determined by the teacher and understanding is assessed based on the alignment of 
student responses with NOS tenets, a duplication of a past intention.185  
A Privileging of Techné 
Like Aristotle himself who appears to have granted theoretical knowledge a 
higher ascendancy over more practical ways of knowing, I contend that science education 
researchers have predicated their use of promoting student understanding of NOS on his 
reasoned account of techné over phronesis. Recalling from an introductory discussion in 
Chapter Two, the former is characterized as an objective, teleologically-based, form of 
understanding whose end, poiesis, contains “…a durable outcome, a product or state of 
affairs which can be precisely specified by the maker before he engages in his activity 
and which, as surviving the latter, provides it with its end or purpose.”186 The precise 
specification mentioned here, in turn, “…enables [the expert maker], through the capacity 
to offer a rational account of it, to provide over his activity with secure mastery.”187 As 
such, the master of a techné is in a position to teach for “…every techné seems to be 
teachable and what is known by techné is learnable,”188 a knowledge of which, once 
learned, enables the learner to find the right means. Consequently, scholarship in the field 
of philosophy of education suggests that the influence of such an account of knowledge is 
apparent in the common practice of teaching and learning “…by isolating in precise 
terms the goals of the activity, [and providing] the teacher with guidelines for controlling 
                                                 
185 See, for example, J.J. Wellington, “What’s Supposed to Happen Sir? Some Problems with Discovery 
Learning,” School Science Review 63 (1981): 167-173. 
186 RG, 9.  
187 Ibid., 9. Dunne goes on to mention in another section of the same text that “…techné is then the source 
of the maker's mastery of his trade and of his ability therefore not only to accomplish a successful result  
(which any handy person might be equally capable of) but in doing so to give a rational account  (logos) of 
his procedures.” See RG, 250 
188 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.3, 25.  
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efficiency and straight-forward criteria for evaluating success.”189 A view of educational 
practice derived from the principles of Aristotle’s techné is comprised of a careful 
deliberation of desirable objectives, a thorough analysis of the appropriate means to be 
used to achieve those objectives, and an intentional assessment of the product resulting 
from the intended poiesis:  
In profiling a teacher’s objectives, this model sought to separate ends and means, 
to repose everything of value that a teacher might accomplish in the ends (i.e. 
objectives) and then to construe all problems of teaching as ones simply of 
finding the most suitable means to the achievement of these ends.190 
 
When examined in light of such a philosophical perspective, it is not difficult to 
conceptualize the influence of an Aristotelian form of techné on the research and reform 
efforts centered on teaching for enhanced NOS understandings. To begin with, the 
sentiments expressed by proponents of the inclusion of NOS considerations as curriculum 
objectives regarding the enhancement of responsible citizenship among students is 
arguably based on the notion of poiesis, where the responsible student is the product of 
the teacher/expert-maker. The abundance of research related to the establishment of a set 
of NOS tenets to serve as reasonable, useful objectives in the planning of classroom 
lessons designed to explicitly teach for mature understandings similarly promotes a view 
of education which conceives of knowledge as knowable in advance. Such an explicit 
approach to pedagogy attempts to isolate the objectives of the particular lesson, and the 
body of research pertaining to the effectiveness of such methods interprets the problems 
of teaching for developed understandings mostly in terms of finding the most appropriate 
means for achieving such ends. Additionally, the extensive discourse surrounding the 
                                                 
189 RG, 5.  
190 Ibid.  
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development of appropriate instruments for assessing understandings as well as the 
language used by researchers in identifying such understandings as naïve, elementary, 
informed, mature, or otherwise, suggests a remarkably close parallel with the theoretical 
account afforded to experience, one which can be separated from knowledge itself and 
determined by knowing better. 
Method, Cognition, Disengagement, and Teachability 
Taken together, I maintain that Aristotle’s techné and Descartes’ cogito comprise 
the philosophical foundations upon which much of the discourse on student 
understanding of NOS is predicated; namely in the primacy of method, the reduction of 
understanding to the domain of cognition, the appeal to a certain distancing between the 
student and his knowing, and the teachability of an NOS curriculum. Knowledge, and 
arguably understanding, is viewed from both of these perspectives as resulting from the 
development and ensuing execution of a specific process, as exemplified by the work of 
the craftsman in the former and the four-step method in the latter. NOS studies influenced 
as such seek to continuously evaluate the effectiveness of pedagogical methods on 
promoting desired understandings while simultaneously assuming those understandings 
to be capable of their own methodical development as explained by various learning 
theories. In reducing understanding to a form of cognition, researchers have promoted an 
element of disengagement, such as in assuming a reflective stance following 
instruction191 and negating previous conceptions in experiencing “… anomalous data to 
induce conceptual shifts in students,”192  purported to be necessary for the development 
of adequate views. This type of disengagement is analogous to being able to step outside 
                                                 
191 Schwartz, Lederman, and Crawford, “Developing Views of Nature of Science.” 
192 Rudolph and Stewart, “Evolution and the Nature of Science,” 1082. 
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of oneself, as exemplified in the Cartesian attempt to subjugate mere opinion in the 
search for reliable knowledge and the maker’s ability to reside over and above his 
product. Lastly, in large part due to their privileging of method as thus conceived, both of 
these philosophical accounts suggest that, assuming a cognitive view, understanding is 
capable of being learned and, consequentially, taught. It would be rather difficult to deny 
the assertion that reform efforts and empirical endeavors asserting the importance of 
teaching for enhanced NOS understandings among secondary science students espouses a 
similar perspective regarding the teachability of NOS. 
As presented, a strong argument exists in support of the influence of the collective 
legacy of both foundationalism and theoretical knowledge, as explicated by Descartes 
and Aristotle, respectively, on science educators’ research on nature-of-science. Whether 
the assumptions that seemingly dominate the discourse on student understanding are 
intentional or even recognized for that matter is a question unanswerable at present 
considering the absence of any report whatsoever on their deliberation. Instead, 
researchers continue to attempt to answer a plethora of questions ranging from the 
appropriateness of certain NOS viewpoints to the degree to which teachers should 
simplify viewpoints for various learners by turning to both epistemological and 
psychological theories of cognitive development.193 In the next chapters, I consider the 
aporia of student understanding of NOS from a philosophically hermeneutical 
perspective. In first questioning the limitations of the predominant view afforded to 
student understandings as presented in this chapter and then reconceptualizing the same 
                                                 
193 For a brief description of such questions and accompanying theories, see Bell, “Perusing Pandora’s 
Box,” 436-442. 
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using Gadamer’s hermeneutics, I aim to extend student understanding and the scholarly 
discourse surrounding that understanding. 
 72 
CHAPER FIVE 
A GADAMERIAN RESPONSE 
 
Introduction 
As outlined in previous chapters, Gadamer offers a reconsideration of the concept 
of understanding in his central text, Truth and Method, which differs not only from the 
interpretation posited by Descartes four centuries earlier but also from the various 
explications put forth by prominent hermeneuts from the Romantic period through his 
own time.194 He argues that “…philosophical hermeneutics takes as its task the opening 
up of the hermeneutical dimension in its full scope, showing its fundamental significance 
for our entire understanding of the world and thus for all the various forms in which this 
understanding manifests itself.”195 His voluminous writings on the subject purport to 
offer “…no new canon of interpretation or new methodological proposals for reforming 
current hermeneutical practice, but seek instead to describe what actually takes place in 
every event of understanding”196 by “…throwing light on the fundamental conditions that 
underlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its modes, scientific and nonscientific 
alike, and that constitute understanding as an event over which the interpreting subject 
                                                 
194 As Linge writes in his introduction to PH: “… this reflexive [Gadamerian] dimension of understanding 
has been all but completely ignored by the science of hermeneutics during the last century. The result has 
been a distorted and one-sided picture of understanding and our relationship to tradition.” PH, xii.  
195 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection,” in David E. Linge, 
ed., Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 18. Here Gadamer 
goes on to provide a short litany of the diverse experiences that have been considered in light of 
hermeneutics.  
196 PH, xxvi.  
73 
 
does not ultimately preside.”197 The present chapter focuses on a further explication of 
philosophical hermeneutics, with particular attention to how such a view of 
understanding contrasts with a Cartesian foundationalism and a technical view of 
knowledge that, as explained in the preceding chapter, purportedly direct the predominant 
conceptualization of student understanding in the NOS literature. The first section takes 
up the themes of the hermeneutic circle and a “rehabilitation of authority and tradition,” 
as described by Gadamer, while the second involves a discussion of questioning, 
experience and application as explored by the philosopher in his “recovery of the 
fundamental hermeneutic problem.” 
The Hermeneutical Circle, the Problem of Prejudice, and the Nature of Horizon 
Gadamer’s thesis on understanding is predicated largely on a hermeneutic circle, 
as explored primarily by Heidegger, and differs significantly from those favored by 
foundationalist and purely theoretical accounts of epistemology. As David Linge writes 
in his introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics: 
Gadamer’s principal contribution to hermeneutics is to be found in his concerted 
effort to shift the focus of discussion away from techniques and methods of 
interpretation, all of which assume understanding to be a deliberate product of 
self-conscious reflection, to the clarification of understanding as an event that in 
its very nature is episodic and trans-subjective.198 
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He acknowledges the influence of such ‘Enlightened’ views by maintaining that “…the 
only thing that gives a judgment dignity is its having a basis, a methodological 
justification (and not the fact that it may actually be correct). This conclusion follows 
only in the spirit of rationalism. It is the reason for discrediting prejudices and the reason 
scientific knowledge claims to exclude them completely.”199 Arguing further against the 
use of any sort of four-step method or poiesis-derived protocol, Gadamer relates the 
proper role of prejudice in the event of understanding to the subjugation of any prescribed 
procedural description of the hermeneutic endeavor:  
It follows that its [hermeneutics] work is not to develop a procedure for 
understanding, but to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place. 
But these conditions do not amount to a procedure or method which the 
interpreter himself must bring to bear on the text; rather, they must be given. The 
prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not 
at his free disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that 
enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder in and lead to 
misunderstandings. Rather this separation must take place in the process of 
understanding itself, and hence hermeneutics must ask how that happens.200  
 
In questioning the idea that objectivity in knowledge is attainable only through the 
application of a “neutralized, prejudice-free consciousness”, Gadamer suggests a view of 
understanding not as a reconstruction of a past tradition but as a mediation, “…an event, 
a movement of history itself in which neither interpreter nor text can be thought of as 
autonomous parts.”201 Such an event is conceptualized not in terms of its methodical 
precision and techné-like applicability, but rather as a game in which “…absorption into 
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the game is an ecstatic self-forgetting that is experienced not as a loss of self-possession, 
but as the free buoyancy of an elevation above oneself.”202 
Gadamer offers the metaphor of the game to emphasize the positive value of the 
inability of the interpreter to disengage arbitrarily not only from his prejudices but also 
from the objects of his interpretation as well, a disengagement ardently sought after by 
adherents to Descartes’ cogito. In addition, the metaphor is extended to challenge a 
reducible form of knowledge predicated on techné by stressing instead a type of self-
knowledge characteristic of a practical form of reason, or phronesis: 
Understanding is not self-understanding in the sense of the self-evident certainty 
idealism asserted it to have, nor is it exhausted in the revolutionary criticism of 
idealism that thinks of the concept of self-understanding as something that 
happens to the self, something through which it becomes an authentic self. Rather, 
I believe that understanding involves a moment of loss of self that should be 
investigated in terms of the structure of the game.203 
 
When the hermeneutic circle, as envisaged first by Heidegger and later by Gadamer, 
assumes the structure of a game, understanding is no longer perceived as a circular 
movement, running backwards and forwards, and ceasing in perfect understanding, a 
view espoused by the Romantics and members of the historical school.204 Instead the 
circle is more fully realized, rather than dissolved, through the interplay of the movement 
of both the interpreter and the tradition of the object of interpretation; an interplay that is 
not subjective but issuing forth from the universality that binds the two.205 For Gadamer, 
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this back and forth movement described is derived not from a set of rules over which the 
interpreter is capable of presiding, as in the event of craft-making, but rather from that 
which happens above our wanting and doing: 
The back and forth movement that takes place within a given field of play does 
not derive from the human game and from playing as a subjective attitude. Quite 
the contrary, even for human subjectivity the real experience of the game consists 
in the fact that something that obeys its own set of laws gains ascendancy in the 
game. To the movement in a determinate direction corresponds a movement in the 
opposite direction.206 
 
Additionally, it should be noted that Gadamer made explicit mention of the uncertainty 
involved in such a notion of play; one that includes a venturing into a foreign, 
traditionary text on the part of the interpreter:  
Rather the game itself is a risk for the player. One can play only with serious 
possibilities. If, for the sake of enjoying his own freedom of decision, someone 
avoids making pressing decisions or plays with possibilities that he is not 
seriously envisaging and which therefore offer no risk that he will choose them 
and thereby limit himself, we say he is only playing with life.207  
 
An understanding predicated on the metaphor of play, then, maintains the constitutive 
elements of Heidegger’s circle and, consequently, Gadamer’s hermeneutics; namely, the 
uncontrollable projection of a series of fore-structures and prejudices onto the horizon of 
a text in order to penetrate for meaning in an effort to “…see through the dogmatism of 
asserting an opposition and separation between the ongoing, natural 'tradition' and the 
reflective appropriation of it.”208 
In order to play the game, then, Gadamer elaborates extensively on the 
interdependent concepts of fore-structures, prejudices, and the nature of the horizon of 
both the interpreter and the text, or interchange, in which he is caught up. He is explicit in 
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his attempt to “… fundamentally rehabilitate the concept of prejudice and acknowledge 
the fact that there are legitimate prejudices,”209 an idea denied by a Cartesian view of 
rationalism which subsequently supported the fundamental prejudice of the 
Enlightenment, the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its authority. 
According to Gadamer, the legacy of such a fundamental prejudice had profound 
implications for numerous academic disciplines due to its inherent reproducibility: 
At the same time, however, Gadamer’s insight does give us occasion to question 
the abstract opposition between knowledge and tradition that has become a dogma 
in hermeneutical theory and to appreciate the sense in which scientific historical 
understanding is itself the bearer and continuer of tradition.210 
 
Philosophical hermeneutics considers prejudices instead not as a “…prison that isolates 
us from the new, but a particular starting point from which understanding advances.”211 It 
is specifically these prejudices, “…constantly at stake right up to the moment of their 
surrender - which surrender could also be called a transformation,”212  that condition all 
understanding. Writing in response to challenges emanating from a Marxist critique of 
ideology by Habermas, Gadamer acknowledges the influence of the fundamental 
prejudice on the denigration of all authority and the ascendancy of a neutral, tradition-
free ideology: 
Authority is by his definition a dogmatic power. I cannot accept the assertion that 
reason and authority are abstract antitheses, as the emancipatory Enlightenment 
did. For in my opinion this abstract antithesis embraced by the Enlightenment is a 
mistake fraught with ominous consequences. In it, reflection is granted a false 
power, and the true dependencies involved are misjudged on the basis of a 
fallacious idealism. It seems evident to me that acceptance or acknowledgement is 
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the decisive thing for relationships to authority. The obedience that belongs to 
true authority is neither blind nor slavish.213 
 
He replaces the foundationalist prejudice against tradition and in favor of the subjugation 
of arbitrary fore-structures with a view of understanding predicated on the concept of a 
legitimate authority and the openness of all pre-understandings. In doing so, he furthers 
the task of hermeneutics beyond that of his predecessors who, as explained briefly in 
Chapter Two, arguably continued to consider understanding in terms of a possible 
disengagement between the interpreter and the object of his interpretation, a 
disengagement analogous to that espoused by adherents of both foundationalism and 
techné: “Beneath their assertion of the finitude and historicity of man, both 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey continue to pay homage to the Cartesian and Enlightenment 
ideal of the autonomous subject who successfully extricates himself from the immediate 
entanglements of history and the prejudices that come with that entanglement.”214 
Gadamer explains his rejection of a disentangled interpreter in terms of his 
concept of effective history and horizon, an extension rather than synonym of the idea of 
a situation, which itself does not admit of objective understanding in that one cannot 
stand outside of it [situation]: 
We define the concept of situation by saying that it represents a standpoint that 
limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the concept of situation is the 
concept of horizon. A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and 
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hence over-values what is nearest to him. On the other hand, to have a horizon 
means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it.215 
 
This looking beyond one’s horizon involves not so much a turning away as it does a 
seeing better, within a larger whole of the tradition and its past, by transposing oneself 
onto a historical horizon. Gadamer contends, however, that “…transposing ourselves 
consists neither in the empathy of one individual for another nor in subordinating another 
person to our own standards; rather it always involves rising to a higher universality that 
overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other.”216 As such, the 
discovery of another horizon affords an understanding that does not inherently admit of 
agreement on the part of the interpreter. A fusion of respective horizons, often considered 
to exist by themselves and constituting the fundamental hermeneutic task, strives to bring 
out the tension between them rather than eschew possible conflict by attempting a naïve 
assimilation of the two. Instead, the polarity that exists between the familiar and strange, 
or different horizons, when considered hermeneutically rather than psychologically, 
constitutes a necessary tension “…between being a historically intended, distanciated 
object and belonging to a tradition,” that functions as “…the true locus of 
hermeneutics.”217 An explicit attempt to extricate this necessary tension is an integral 
element of both a foundationalist epistemology and, arguably, a theoretical approach to 
reason in their respective claims to maintain an element of sovereignty for the knower or 
maker over his understanding. 
 
                                                 
215 TM, 301. 
216 Ibid., 304.  
217 Ibid., 295.  
80 
 
The Value of the Dialectic 
In addition to characterizing the nature of understanding in terms of fore-
structures, legitimate prejudices, and a fusion of horizons, the metaphor of play is 
extended to include the priority of the question, the nature of experience, and the problem 
of application in conceptualizing the event that is understanding. For Gadamer, the 
function of hermeneutics “…becomes of itself a questioning of things and is always in 
part so defined,”218 where “…working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring 
the right horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition.”219 
Historically effected consciousness, which both determines and is determined by the 
aforementioned fusion of horizons, is effectual in finding the right questions to ask.  
These questions, which serve to open up possibilities and keep them open, result 
from the productive condition afforded by the temporal distance between respective 
horizons and maintain the tension of prejudice structures put at risk: 
If a prejudice becomes questionable in view of what another person or a text says 
to us, this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the text or the other person 
accepted as valid in its place. In fact our own prejudice is properly brought into 
play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it able to experience the 
other’s claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play himself.220 
 
Because it is considered more of a disposition than an action to be able to determine what 
is questionable, Gadamer contends that the idea of method, and consequently 
teachability, thus remains limited for understanding. Conceived of instead as the art of 
asking questions, the interpreter is able to remain open to further questioning and engages 
in a valuable dialectic that constitutes real dialogue. Here, again, the concept of play is 
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used to characterize the type of self-understanding inherent in assuming such a 
hermeneutical perspective: 
It cannot be denied that in an actual dialogue of this kind something of the 
character of accident, favor and surprise - and in the end, of buoyancy, indeed, of 
elevation - that belongs to the nature of the game is present. And surely the 
elevation of the dialogue will not be experienced as a loss of self-possession, but 
rather as an enrichment of our self, but without us thereby becoming aware of 
ourselves.221 
 
This type of questioning does not amount to either a technical quest for information, as in 
the case of posing a loaded question or calling for a familiar answer, or a successful 
means of persuasion, as in the case of the sophistic endeavor to argue another person 
down, but rather motivates the development of subsequent questions, limited, of course, 
by the horizon of the questioner. 
The logical structure of the question is, in turn, implicit in the Gadamerian 
conceptualization of experience, as discussed in Chapter Two. Similarly bounded by the 
nature of horizon and caught up in the dialectic of interpretation, experience reaches its 
fulfillment in remaining open to new experiences and not in its being qualified as a 
confirmable event, as in the case of Aristotle’s techné. For the expert maker, experience 
assumes a teleological function in that objective concepts or products assume the 
distinction of being its proper outcome. On the other hand, for Gadamer, the idea of 
experience is characterized by a Hegelian consideration of a “… new experience that 
impresses itself on us precisely by interrupting or contradicting our previous experience 
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and thereby enriching it.”222 This particular view denotes a sense of uncertainty, 
irreversibility, and the limitedness of prediction, all constitutive elements in his concept 
of play. As such, experience escapes any methodical attempts at control and 
objectification and permits for the continual development of new pre-understandings. 
Gadamer maintains a distinction between these understandings and those described by 
both Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas and the Aristotelian notion of a sovereign maker 
presiding over his poiesis: “Understanding is not, in fact, understanding better, either in 
the case of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or in the sense of 
fundamental superiority of conscious over unconscious production. It is enough to say 
that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.”223 
Because the historical horizon of experience is neither accidental nor subjective 
but rather an ontological condition constitutively involved in understanding, the idea of 
application cannot be construed of as distinct from the event of interpretation itself. In 
fact, in the fundamental task of hermeneutics, to “…explicitly and consciously bridge the 
temporal distance that separates the interpreter from the text and overcome the alienation 
of meaning that the text has undergone,”224 resides the very act of its application. Unlike 
the expert craftsman perfecting his techné, or the foundationalist employing his four-step 
method, or the adherent of a pragmatic philosophy reducing all situations to problems to 
be solved through technical or objective manipulation, the understanding interpreter does 
not apply himself to any sort of detachment, cognitive or otherwise, but rather remains 
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entangled in the mystery characteristic of self-understanding, as envisaged by Aristotle’s 
phronesis and clarified by Gadamer: 
The genuine reality of the hermeneutical process seems to me to encompass the 
self-understanding of the interpreter as well as what is interpreted…The real event 
of understanding goes beyond what we can bring to the understanding of the other 
person's words through methodic effort and critical self-control...Through every 
dialogue something different comes to be... It is not really we ourselves who 
understand: it is always a past that allows us to say, “I have understood.”225 
 
Similar to the irreducibility of experience to a predictable, controllable event, the notion 
of application, when conceived of in terms of the ancient conception of moral self-
knowledge, is subsumed in the very act of understanding which itself arises out of a 
dialectic of question and answer between the tension-filled temporal distance between the 
horizons of the interpreter and the object of interpretation, between the familiar and the 
unfamiliar.  
As presented in this chapter, Gadamer posits a view of understanding that differs 
considerably from Descartes’ epistemology and technical forms of reasoning. Predicated 
on the projection of non-arbitrary fore-structures, the possibility of legitimate prejudices, 
and a historically-effected consciousness that results in an interplay between that which is 
close at hand and that which is beyond, his philosophical hermeneutics undeniably rejects 
any sort of methodical, routinized attempt to reduce instances of interpretation to 
predictable, controllable events whose pre-determined telos, or end, prescribes all 
necessary action. Insofar as an argument has been made in Chapter Four concerning the 
considerable influence of this latter approach to understanding on the research and 
discourse surrounding student understanding of NOS, incorporating Gadamer’s 
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hermeneutics into that same discourse permits not only a consideration of the limitations 
of such an approach but also allows for enlarging both the discourse itself and the nature 
of student understanding. In the next chapter, then, I use the constitutive elements of 
philosophical hermeneutics as explained here in the specific context of conceptualizing 
student understanding of nature-of-science.   
 85 
CHAPTER SIX 
ENLARGING THE DISCOURSE 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, I contend that the predominant view on teaching for 
developed student understandings of nature-of-science is largely predicated on particular 
philosophical assumptions that favor a foundationalist epistemology while 
simultaneously emphasizing the characteristic components of an Aristotelian form of 
technical reasoning. Additionally, I maintain that, when considered from a hermeneutic 
perspective, such assumptions may result in a foreclosed understanding, an understanding 
that is reproducible through a series of controlled, methodical attempts that aim to reduce 
it to a teleologically-based, readily assessable form of knowledge. I then offer 
philosophical hermeneutics, as explicated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, as a viable referent 
for reconceptualizing such understandings so that they may be more fully realized rather 
than perfectly completed. In this chapter, I incorporate the constitutive elements of 
Gadamer’s philosophy, both from his “rehabilitation of authority and tradition” as well as 
his “recovery of the fundamental hermeneutic problem,” into the discourse surrounding 
student understandings of NOS. In particular, I focus on such discourse as contained 
within the major lines of inquiry in the science education literature as presented in 
Chapter Three: namely, a multifarious rationale supporting NOS pedagogy, a 
consideration of viable NOS tenets for pre-college students, learners’ preconceptions 
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concerning NOS, the effectiveness of explicit approaches to teaching for the promotion 
of NOS considerations, and the use of varied methods for assessing student 
understandings. Before proceeding, I think it important to reiterate here both the nature 
and purpose of engaging in a dialectic among arguably conflicting views related to the 
conceptualization of the notion of understanding. 
Preserving Gadamer’s intention to offer “…no new canon of interpretation or new 
methodological proposals for reforming current hermeneutical practice,”226 I do not 
recommend a new approach to teach for enhanced understanding of NOS concepts, nor 
do I suggest a methodical, hermeneutic replacement for the currently accepted paradigm 
within the NOS literature of conceptual change theory and other psychologically-derived 
models of cognition. Instead, I strive to similarly “… retain the term hermeneutics not in 
the sense of a methodology but as a theory of the real experience that thinking is.”227 In 
that I began a philosophical examination of the nature of understanding because of a 
seemingly limited view afforded to it by researchers and policy makers in the science 
education communities, I aim to consciously avoid any attempt to present a view of 
understanding, or teaching and learning for that matter, that can result in a technical form 
of reasoning, devoid of new experiences and further questioning: “It is just that one 
cannot start out with serious misgivings about the ascendancy of technical reason and 
with a correlative desire to vindicate the integrity of practice and then, when one turns to 
philosophy for confirmation of these misgivings and of this desire, to entertain an 
implicitly technical notion of philosophy.”228 By engaging in hermeneutical inquiry thus 
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conceived, I acknowledge the necessary tension between the philosophical assumptions 
of the various participants engaged in the dialectic and endeavor to remain open to the 
horizon of the other; an openness perhaps not entirely adhered to by Gallagher in his 
hermeneutical questioning of the modernist view of education, as argued by Kerdeman 
and explained in Chapter Two. The next section of this chapter advances the discourse of 
student understanding of NOS considerations as Gadamer’s hermeneutics sought to do 
for understanding in general.  
Self- Understanding and Necessary Tension 
As explained in Chapter Three, two of the rationales supporting the inclusion of 
NOS considerations in the seminal science education reform documents and substantial 
body of empirical research over the last two decades include seeking to ameliorate the 
possible epistemic tensions encountered by learners when confronted with metaphysical, 
epistemological, or other worldview perspectives that may differ from their own and 
attempting to promote a greater sense of responsibility and develop enhanced decision-
making skills among students. Insofar as the latter of these seems more characteristic of a 
moral rather than technical development, a consideration of an Aristotelian practical 
wisdom, or phronesis, permits for an alternative understanding of such development, as 
distinct from that favored by a privileging of reason based on the analogy of an expert 
maker, or techné. The widely-accepted assertion that “… at the foundations of many 
illogical decisions and unreasonable positions are misunderstandings of the character of 
science”229 both inaugurated and maintained a series of deliberate attempts on the part of 
leaders in the science education community to include NOS considerations among the 
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important learning outcomes of both national curricula and exemplary pedagogical 
practices. These same researchers, while at times acknowledging the ability of students 
designated as having fully formed or complete understandings to further evolve beyond a 
prescribed model,230 subsequently adhere to a prescriptive account of knowledge that 
varies from the idea of self-understanding. Rather than recognize the loss of self, as 
explained by Gadamer in the metaphor of play and inherent in his account of 
understanding in terms of phronesis, NOS advocates maintain a belief in the sought-after 
sovereignty of the expert over his poiesis, or craft, as evidenced by their insistence on the 
need “…to use scientific knowledge to make informed personal and societal 
decisions,”231 denoting a sense of empowerment and freedom afforded to learners by a 
mature understanding of NOS. Conceived of instead as a dialectical experience that 
involves not so much “… a loss of self-possession, but rather [as] an enrichment of our 
self, but without us thereby becoming aware of ourselves,”232 the idea of self-
understanding offers researchers an alternative perspective through which to consider the 
various rationales supporting NOS instruction, such as personal and societal 
responsibility. 
In addition to promoting enhanced decision-making skills and responsible 
citizenry, several NOS proponents contend that a consideration of the development of 
scientific knowledge and subsequent discussion contrasting such a development with 
other ways of knowing eschew potential tensions that may arise between conflicting 
worldviews. According to Gadamer, however, these tensions are in fact integral to the 
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very act of understanding itself insofar as interpretation is comprised of an interplay 
between the horizons of the interpreter and the object of interpretation, in this case, the 
student and the nature-of-science, respectively. Referring again to the metaphor of play, 
the student understands NOS only when his own prejudices are stirred up and put to risk 
by being confronted with the various characteristics of the scientific enterprise and 
scientific epistemology, in all of their forms. A deliberate attempt to avoid any element of 
risk-taking, then, on the part of researchers and science educators alike espouses a view 
of understanding in which “… for the sake of enjoying his own freedom of decision, 
someone avoids making pressing decisions or plays with possibilities that he is not 
seriously envisaging and which therefore offer no risk that he will choose them and 
thereby limit himself.”233  
Another line of inquiry that explicitly aims to dismiss the Gadamerian concept of 
a necessary, tense-filled proximity between the familiar and the strange involves the 
consideration of a consensus view of nature-of-science and resultant tenets purported to 
be appropriate for secondary science students. In the case of the former, a denial or, at 
best, a relegation of philosophical discord concerning the nature-of-science and its 
characterization for students contrasts greatly with the hermeneutical endeavor to 
question the dominant opinion by remaining open to the hermeneutical idea that unless 
one understands differently, one does not understand at all. In the case of the latter, a set 
of prescribed NOS tenets that serve to provide for the construction of standardized 
definitions of fully formed NOS understandings promotes a view of understanding 
conceptualized by the hermeneutic circle as envisaged prior to the work of Heidegger and 
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Gadamer in the last century. For these researchers, student understandings are evaluated 
in terms of their alignment with such pre-determined tenets. Gallagher explains this 
alignment in terms of a desired coincidence between the understandings of the student 
and those of the teacher or science education community. Whereas, for the majority of 
NOS researchers, the concept of fully formed or complete understandings is evidenced by 
a perfect alignment between these respective understandings, such a coincidence results 
in a foreclosed understanding by attempting to move back and forth along the 
hermeneutic circle until perfect understanding is achieved. When conceptualized in terms 
of philosophical hermeneutics instead, “…the back and forth movement that takes place 
within a given field of play does not derive from the human game and from playing as a 
subjective attitude.”234 Understanding conceived in terms of a conservative hermeneutics 
assumes a purely reproductive character that arguably leads to a form of education in 
which “…the teacher remains very much in control of the discussion and students' input 
is limited to answering questions that are posed by the teacher.”235 A Gadamerian view of 
dialectic, alternatively, challenges the use of questions constructed so as to elicit 
particular responses and, instead, encourages a dialogic conversation that results from 
questions emanating from an interchange between the particular horizons of the known 
and the unknown. 
Appropriated Telos, Positive Prejudices, and Different Understandings 
In addition to foreclosing the dialectic of understanding by intentionally avoiding 
necessary tensions, a prescribed set of tenets, representative of a consensus view of NOS, 
inevitably functions as viable, predetermined objectives to be applied in the development 
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of explicit teaching practices aimed at enhancing student understandings of NOS. In such 
instances, these objectives constitute the desirable end of the instructional process; a 
process that can be conceptualized in terms of Aristotle’s teleological account of 
knowledge, or techné: “This activity issues in a durable outcome, a product or state of 
affairs which can be precisely specified by the maker before he engages in his activity 
and which, as surviving the latter, provides it with its end or purpose (telos).”236 As 
discussed earlier, techné provides “…a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the 
how and with-what of the making process,”237 and consequently provides a foundation 
for constructing explicit, controllable pedagogical methods over which a teacher can 
preside with certain mastery. Dunne maintains that such a view of education considers 
teaching as “…no longer embedded in particular contexts or within cultural, linguistic, 
religious, or political traditions which may be at work in all kinds of tacit and nuanced 
ways in teachers and pupils as persons.”238 In contrast, teaching for enhanced student 
NOS understanding, considered in terms of philosophical hermeneutics, attempts to 
refrain from assuming a similar teleological perspective. Instead, the end is conceived of 
as constitutively caught up in the activity of teaching itself and does not admit of being 
isolated from the horizon of the classroom, as in the case of praxis which “... required for 
its regulation a kind of knowledge that was more personal and experiential, more supple 
and less formulable, than the knowledge conferred by techné.”239 
Just as in the event of teaching where “its secret is that there is an element in it of 
“happening”- so that one can never preside over it, or experience sovereignty through it, 
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as one can in the case of making,”240 NOS understandings conceptualized in terms of 
Aristotle’s phronesis and Gadamer’s hermeneutics do not admit of an autonomous 
knower capable of extricating himself from the authority of his tradition. Such a position 
contrasts greatly with both Descartes and later members of the Romantic period and the 
historical school who respectively endeavored either to eschew entirely or to relegate to 
the designation of misunderstandings anticipatory prejudice structures so as to achieve 
correct understandings. The influence of both a foundationalist epistemology and 
conservative hermeneutics on research pertaining to student understanding of NOS is 
evidenced by the plethora of empirical studies advocating for the proper diagnosis of 
student prior knowledge so as to teach for conceptual change or enhanced views of the 
development of scientific knowledge and the scientific enterprise. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, these studies espoused a particular understanding of fore-structures and 
oftentimes reduced their significance in favor of inducing a desirable conceptual shift.  
For philosophical hermeneutics, these prejudice structures assume a positive rather than 
negative value and, similar to the notion of temporal distance as explained earlier, are 
actually integral in the act of understanding considered as a projection of such fore-
structures onto a foreign horizon. As such, student prejudices pertaining to NOS are not 
inherently opposed to but rather constitute the necessary conditions for developing 
different understandings. At the same time, these prejudices are not amenable to 
methodical manipulation, as in the case of case of Descartes’ foundationalism, Romantic 
hermeneutics, and conceptual change theory, and must remain open not so much to “what 
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we do or what we ought to do, but [to] what happens to us over and above our wanting 
and doing.”241 
Insofar as fore-structures maintain their positive value, understanding is not 
regarded as a forward-moving, progressive development as conceptualized in cognitive 
models of learning. Rather than characterize understandings in terms of a transformation 
from inadequate into adequate views or naïve towards more intermediary or informed 
conceptions, Gadamer’s hermeneutics considers understanding as capable of being 
enlarged into different understandings, not necessarily superior or better, than those 
inherited from the horizon of tradition. Such a perspective is predicated on the 
aforementioned Gadamerian notions of experience and questioning, both of which seek to 
retain an open dialectic that does not admit of routine or foreclosure. In that this same 
dialectic does not have “…its proper fulfillment in definitive knowledge,”242 efforts to 
assess student understandings, through either quantitative or qualitative methods, and 
subsequently characterize those understandings, either categorically or as being situated 
along a developmental continuum, become questionable. Philosophical hermeneutics 
additionally permits a reconsideration of these assessments in light of its insistence on an 
inseparable relation between understanding and application, where “... application is 
neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional part of understanding, but codetermines it 
as a whole from the beginning.”243 This descriptive account of the event that is 
understanding further affords NOS researchers the opportunity to enlarge the 
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philosophical discourse pertaining to the act by which students make sense of the 
multifarious descriptions of both scientific epistemology and the scientific enterprise. 
As presented in the last three chapters, a consideration of philosophical 
hermeneutics engages a dialectic with current assumptions on the nature of understanding 
which underpin much of the research and policy pertaining to NOS pedagogy. Whether in 
their attempt to propose criteria or tenets to function as cognitive learning objectives 
capable of being assessed or their ongoing consideration of the effectiveness of various 
pedagogical strategies aimed at promoting the development of desirable, informed 
understandings, science educators remain indebted to the tradition of the foundationalist 
primacy of method and a technical privileging of telos, both of which advance a notion of 
understanding that is teachable. It is precisely because of its perceived teachability that 
NOS understandings continue to maintain a prominent position in the larger discourse on 
science education reform. As addressed in earlier chapters, however, an educational 
philosophy predicated on such a view of understanding might result in a view of teaching 
and learning reduced to a set of techniques which simply allows us to manage 
information which in turn can result in a direct transmission of the same information that 
amounts to a potential form of indoctrination. In that Aristotle’s phronesis concerns itself 
with a self-understanding that does not admit of a specific, predetermined poiesis, 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics permits an enlarged discourse that avoids both the foreclosure 
of student understanding and the forestalling of the discourse itself.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUSTAINED DIALECTIC 
In the preceding chapters of this dissertation, I have attempted to make the case 
for a reconceptualization of student understanding of nature-of-science concepts based on 
philosophical hermeneutics. Firstly, I contend that current views on the teaching and 
learning of NOS, as explained in Chapter Three, are predicated on a particular notion of 
understanding, whose inherent assumptions were analyzed in Chapter Four, argued by 
philosophers of education to contribute to pedagogical practices that may limit rather than 
permit for the development of student understanding. Then, I suggest in Chapter Six that 
a Gadamerian view of understanding, as described in Chapter Five, unlike the dominant 
foundationalist, technical view arguably implicit in the majority of the NOS literature and 
reform efforts, has the potential for enlarging student understandings of NOS as well the 
broader educational discourse surrounding such understandings. In these concluding 
pages, I wish to further support this last assertion regarding the value of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in sustaining the dialectic between the multiple perspectives concerning 
student understandings of NOS considerations. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, several of the primary reasons provided in 
support of the inclusion of NOS pedagogy in both research and policy reform are 
predicated on both acknowledging the epistemological worth, and even supremacy, of 
scientific knowledge and maintaining a positive image and public opinion of the 
scientific enterprise. The impetus for such proposals has been argued to have resulted 
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largely in reaction to the influence of a variety of factors, some of which include the 
publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, subsequent 
discourse by prominent sociologists of science, and work by learning theorists positing 
constructivist accounts of knowledge - all of which have been interpreted, at least in part, 
to present a relativistic view of NOS.244 While the question of whether or not Kuhn’s 
seminal text did in fact provide the necessary background against which to launch a 
postmodern rebuttal to the claims of science or researchers interested in explicating the 
sociology of scientific knowledge collectively sought to undermine its development and 
reduce its epistemological merit are worthwhile and interesting, they have been taken up 
elsewhere and are not the subject of present concern.245  Likewise, the ongoing debate 
regarding the impact of particularly radical constructivist learning theories, such as those 
explicated by Ernst von Glasersfeld,246 on both the ontological and epistemological views 
afforded to science in recent national reform documents has garnered extensive attention 
from notable scholars and continues to be a point of discussion among concerned science 
educators.247 The point I wish to make here does not involve an evaluation of the various 
assertions put forth by philosophers, historians, sociologists, and science educators 
concerning the value of the respective views on the nature-of-science but rather I suggest 
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that, by situating the aporia arrived at through the interpretation of multiple perspectives 
in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, scholars can sustain the discourse surrounding student 
understandings without succumbing to the temptation to consider such understandings as 
either perfectly foreclosed or subjectively relativistic interpretations of NOS. 
As explained in Chapter One, Gallagher positions philosophical hermeneutics as a 
moderate form of understanding situated between the more conservative claims of 
Schleiermacher, Betti, and Hirsch, and the more radical views of Nietzche, Heidegger, 
and Derrida: 
Moderate hermeneutics proposes a somewhat optimistic view of interpretation. 
Interpretation involves creativity and not just reproduction; the reader participates, 
just as much as the author does, in putting together the meaning… This optimism 
might be contrasted, on the one side, with the wishful thinking of the conservative 
school and, on the other side, with what might appear to be the nihilism of radical 
hermeneutics.248  
 
He supports his contention by explaining the event that is understanding in terms of the 
Gadamerian fusion of horizons resulting from the projecting of prejudice structures, 
embedded in language, onto the horizon of the object of interpretation. Gallagher 
maintains that language functions so as to limit our ability to gain absolute meaning, as in 
the case of conservative hermeneutics, while still permitting some access to interpretation 
in the form of a dialogical conversation, a conversation that does not then admit of a 
purely subjective account of understanding. As such, the philosopher of education 
suggests that subjective and objective interpretations represent the extremes of 
understanding, both of which are inaccessible.  
The case against a conservative rendering of understanding, as advanced in some 
mode by literary scholars of the Romantic period, historians of the 18th and 19th centuries, 
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and educational philosophers up to the present, has been a significant focus throughout 
this thesis and, as such, has been addressed, in considerable detail, throughout the 
preceding chapters of this paper. Rather than differentiate between the acts of 
interpretation and meaning making, as did Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Hirsch, and strive 
for complete understanding of a supposedly original intention, Gadamer, by uniting the 
once disparate subilitas of understanding, interpretation, and application, proposed an 
alternative description of the very experience of thinking itself. The value, of course, of 
incorporating such a perspective into the discourse of NOS understandings is evidenced 
by the inherent inability of its adherents to provide a complete or final account of 
understanding, thereby forestalling the very nature of the dialogue. But the question may 
remain, however, as to how to avoid relegating the various perspectives involved in the 
conversation to merely subjective opinions or mental operations incapable of being 
reconciled and therefore arbitrary and of no consequence. It is in response to this final, 
particular aporia, then, that I appeal to Gadamer’s realism, as described by at least one 
philosopher, in my attempt to offer some further explanation of the import of his 
hermeneutics of understanding for both science educators and the larger educational 
community as well. 
In his editor’s introduction to Hermeneutics and Truth,249 philosopher Brice R. 
Wachterhauser distinguishes between the various hermeneutical perspectives that resulted 
from a turning away from a belief in dialectical completeness and absolute certainty. 
While agreeing that such conceptions “… can no longer be considered as unproblematic 
hallmarks of truth,” he contends that a number of prominent hermeneuts, such as Derrida, 
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Nietzche, and Rorty, are guilty of committing a non sequitur in their assuming that, as a 
consequence, “… the concept of truth itself has outlived its cognitive usefulness and 
philosophic importance”250 as well.  
Only by seeing our conversation as ultimately governed by the norm of truth do 
our many attempts to make a point in a conversation become something more 
than the utterance of a series of sounds which we hope will affect the behavior of 
our interlocutor for our own advantage. Only the sincere search for truth 
adequately distinguishes rational inquiry from mere sophistry.251 
 
Rather than maintain a principled impossibility of any sort of real communication 
between different viewpoints, each hermetically sealed off from the other, he argues that 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, by understanding these same differences as differences of 
perspective, assumes a shared sense of reality beyond them, thereby precluding any 
attempt at positing a relative account of knowledge. Instead, he characterizes Gadamer’s 
theory of understanding as perspectival realism: 
…because Gadamer insists again and again that the thing itself is always grasped 
from a historically contingent, linguistically mediated perspective. This 
lingustic/historical perspective functions as both a condition and a limit on our 
understanding. The upshot of such a position is a view of human knowledge 
which is inherently 'open', unable to come to final closure, or chart an 
unambiguous line of progress but which does not despair of the possibility that 
finite human beings can know reality itself.252  
 
This knowing of reality can be traced to Heidegger’s earlier interpretation of truth 
that takes place in the “…clearing of Being’s disclosure,” whereby particular aspects of 
reality are uncovered in the act of understanding. Such understanding, however, is not to 
be construed as either complete or exhaustive in that “…the conditions which make for 
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disclosure also make for some inevitable obfuscation and covering over.”253 
Wachterhauser develops a set of theses that seek to encapsulate this distinctive form of 
realism which maintains that “…the whole thing or reality is present in the finite 
linguistic view and yet no linguistic view exhausts the thing.”254 Insofar, then, as he 
accepts the inherent contradictions that will arise from the inevitable incompatibility of 
certain linguistic views, Gadamer understands such discord to be a positive, productive 
impetus to a deeper truth: “Because I experience both the truth of each account, as well as 
the contradictions between these accounts, I both need to interpret to eliminate the 
contradictions and simultaneously have reason to think that the interpretation can in 
principle, be successful.”255  
The value of recognizing the “…the possibility of any interpretation that is 
simultaneously linguistically-mediated, socially-constituted and reality based”256 is 
hopefully obvious with regard to student understanding of NOS concepts as well as the 
broader discipline of education. By taking understanding to be more than a simple re-
construction of some a priori pattern of meaning and an effort to reach some type of 
agreement about something, philosophical hermeneutics advances the primacy of the 
question in such a manner so as to suggest that “… one questions every question one 
understands.”257 Preserving the Hegelian ideal of a whole truth while acknowledging that 
the whole is never actually arrived at functions as an integral assumption for our efforts at 
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interpretation that, as Wachterhauser maintains, is “neither naïve nor nihilistic” and does 
not admit simply of “…an exchange of noises either in chorus or counterpoint designed 
to produce a desired effect, but in no sense are they noises which contain truth.”258 The 
constitutive elements of such a view of understanding, then, do not allow for a complete 
interpretation of some specified object, nor do they diminish the concept of 
understanding to subjective opinion or mere belief, but rather they provide the necessary 
conditions for sustaining the dialectic and subsequently enlarging both student 
conceptions of NOS and our own perspectives regarding the event that takes place in the 
fusion of horizons between the familiar and the strange, involving both disclosure and 
concealment, and remaining open to further experiences – the event that we call 
understanding.
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